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ABSTRACT
Military base redevelopment is a complex process that necessitates cooperation between
government (on the federal, state, and local levels) and the private sector. From a policy
point of view, government has, and will continue to play a significant role in base
transfers and conversions. Yet with regard to the ongoing development of these sites,
success is contingent upon private sector investment.
This thesis hypothesizes that there are issues facing private developers that are inherent
to the military base redevelopment experience. Some of these issues are the result of
working under the authority of a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA). Others stem
from the complexities attendant to property formally owned by the military. This paper
uncovers such issues as control, timing and uncertainty, signaling and externalities,
infrastructure, and environmental remediation. These issues are interdependent, and
may determine the types of investors (developers) who are best suited to work at former
military sites.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Development
Associate Dean of Architecture and Planning
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
The end to the Cold War, coupled with the reduction in United States military forces,
has resulted in unprecedented base closings nationwide. The signing in July 1992, of the
National Base Closure and Realignment Plan is the latest (and largest) chapter in a
series of military base closures dating back to 1961. Despite its reputation, the
government has been remarkably efficient with regard to this task, closing more than 240
bases since 1988.
Once a base is slated for closure, it becomes subject to the Federal Disposal Process.
This complex process generally involves giving control to a Local Redevelopment
Authority (LRA) which must make sites hierarchically available to federal agencies,
state, county and local governments, and to the homeless'. Any remaining property is
then available to the private sector. Whereas the federal government once conveyed
sites to local authorities for as little as a dollar, current mandates 2 call for property to be
disposed of at "full market value", although changes' in 1994 provide exceptions to this
rule.
Consequences
Because the communities affected by base closures face potential loss of jobs, service
users and tax revenue, these closures are met with both fear and resistance. Bases once
provided an avenue for politicians to "bring home the bacon," now they find themselves
inextricably caught in the tangle of what to do in the closure's aftermath. Political
battles begin to overshadow pragmatism. One thing is clear however, opportunity lies in
action. Redevelopment or conversion, therefore, has become the official mantra.
Successful base conversion generally implies utilizing the real estate such that the area's
loss of jobs is mitigated and a net benefit to the community(s) can be created. This
implies attracting and/or generating jobs as well as providing housing, educational and
recreational facilities. Furthermore, as the federal government tries to maximize revenues
generated from the "sale" of these bases, LRA's are under increasing pressure to secure
uses which maximize residual land values. Traditionally, government has played a
major role in ongoing redevelopment efforts. This role has taken the form not only of
'Under the terms of the McKinney Act
2 1988 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
subsidies, but also of direct involvement in placing federal and state offices, prisons, etc.
on the sites. Yet given the enormous amount of federal lands becoming available under
the base closure program and the finite number of these types of governmental uses, the
arithmetic becomes obvious. Furthermore, given ever tightening budgetary constraints on
both the federal and state level, coupled with the unpopularity of "pork" style federal
subsidies, future prospects for significant direct governmental investment appear dim.
Role of the Private Sector
The inherent issues and complexity of base closings necessitate cooperation between
government (on the federal, state, and local levels) and the private sector. From a policy
point of view, government has, and will continue to play a significant role in base
transfers and conversions. Yet with regard to the ongoing development of these sites,
success is contingent upon private investment. In fact, despite significant past direct
government participation, the lion's share of credit for successful base conversion' goes
to private sector investment. Furthermore, given current (and anticipated) government
budgetary constraints, attracting private sector investment will be even more critical in
the future. This idea is not novel, having become apparent through the urban renewal
experience of the 1960's and 1970's. President Carter articulated this idea in his 1978
report on policies to help cities:
"National Urban policy must reflect a strong and effective partnership
between the public and private sector...Federal, state and local funds, no
matter how plentiful, will not be enough to solve our urban problems. The
private sector must help. Only it can provide the capital needed for
rebuilding and growing; only it can carry out the large-scale development
programs necessary to provide healthy local economies."'[italics added]
Although President Carter was not speaking about military base redevelopment per se,
the applicability of these ideas to base redevelopment in the 1990's and beyond is clear.
3 Pryor Amendments to 1994 Defense Authorization Bill (see Section 2.2).
4 Charlestown Navy Yard for example (discussed in this paper)
5 U.S. President, National Urban Policy Report, (Washington D.C. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1978).
1.2 Research Question(s)
The focus for this paper's research begins under the assumption that the factors and
determinants influencing developers decisions to pursue projects at "conventional
private sector sites"6 are also issues at military sites.
This paper will focus on the issues facing private developers (investment) in regard to
pursuing projects at military bases undergoing conversion. Specifically, it will explore
the hypothesis that there are issues surrounding private sector investment at military
sites and that these issues are unique by virtue of the conversion process.
Control
Both the American urban renewal experience and experiences with large planned and
mixed use developments may offer lessons applicable to military base conversion.
Central to this issue is the imposition of specific uses and guidelines as mandated by an
entity acting as "master developer".
As Bernard Frieden discusses in his book Downtown, Inc., early joint interest in
investment and redevelopment in downtown areas were characterized by compromise
between the public entities orchestrating the redevelopment efforts and the developers
exploiting these opportunities. This success was a result of the fact that "neither side
imposed a narrow agenda on the other" and on the cooperative add-hoc nature of the
transactions. As the urban renewal movement matured, however, municipal renewal
entities unilaterally imposed strict redevelopment plans many times only to find that
6 Conventional private sector sites is an arbitrarily chosen phrase that is meant to refer to sites
that are exchanged in the private sector and are not subject to "extraordinary" regulation. In
other words, sites that are not subject to unusual regulation outside of the typical municipal
planning, zoning and regulatory process.
7 Frieden, Bernard J., Downtown, Inc. How America Rebuilds Cities, MIT Press, 1989, pg.19.
developers were not interested in pursuing those plans.' Likewise, some military sites
have fallen into this same trap sprung from unilateral and myopic planning.'
Similarly, large, masterplanned communities and mixed-use developments face many of
these same issues. Success is contingent upon balancing market and social needs in an
attempt to maximize value on an aggregate level. As Wheaton and DiPasquale discuss
in their book Urban Economics and the Real Estate markets, a single developer on a site
may be able to internalize externalities thereby generating the maximum residual land
value, whereas multiple developers will act in their best interest without regard for the
greater whole. Yet this issue is not easily addressed, especially when a single "master
developer" is not investing directly in individual parcel development. In this case, as
Mouchly et al point out, "the developer's basic task with these projects is to create value
to all the participants in the process"." These are issues that are not only relevant to
military base development, but are also especially complex. Given that LRA's not only
must balance the needs of the market, communities, lenders/investors and developers,
but also must attempt to maximize value, the question arises; from the private
developer's perspective, have these issues been successfully addressed and how have
they [the developers] responded?
Timing and Certainty
Related to the issue of control is the developer's need to be able to plan with reasonable
certainty and to execute those plans expeditiously. With regard to development, this
issue is non-trivial as nowhere is the adage "time is money" more appropriate. The base
disposal and reuse process is extremely complex and lengthy. Furthermore, once a deal
has been struck with an LRA, a developer does not necessarily have either the
opportunity and/or the right to now commence the project on his own schedule and
pace. This can be due to any number of reasons ranging from bureaucratic delays to
8 Detroit's experience with the Gratiot residential project is typical of this problem. Planning for the
project began in 1947. Ignoring the business community, the tortured planning process finally ended in a
request for proposals in 1952 only to find that no developers were interested in the project. The renewal
plans were then revised to allow more construction in an attempt to make the project more attractive. This
effort was met with only two very poor and unacceptable proposals. By the end of 1954, the city decided to
go to business people and private developers for help in formulating a plan. Finally, Detroit was able to
sell the site to a developer and the housing opened in 1958. Newark, New Jersey had a similar experience
with its North Ward project.
9 Watertown Arsenal for example. Discussed in Section 5.0.
"' Wheaton, William and DePasquale, Denise, Urban Economics and the Real Estate Markets, Prentice-Hall,
1996.
" Mouchly, Ehud, and Peiser, Richard, "Value for Everyone," Urban land, (August 1993), pg. 16.
environmental and infrastructure concerns (both discussed below). This stands in stark
contrast to most conventional private sector sites where the developer is more or less
master of his destiny. This paper will explore the suspicion that this is an important
issue in both developer's willingness to pursue projects on military bases and the
satisfaction of that experience. William Gilligan, Vice President of Toll Brothers, Inc. -
one of the nation's largest home builders, remarking on interest in acquiring a site at
Weymouth Naval Air Station, 2 expressed this sentiment that although the site's location
is very desirable and that Toll Brothers is having difficulty finding appropriate sites,
concerns over the uncertainty of the reuse planning process and disposal timetables have
precluded them from spending time and resources pursuing what would otherwise be
under serious consideration. 3
Signaling and Externalities
Little has been written on the "herd mentality" of developers. This theory postulates
that developers may wait until there are examples of success at a site before pursuing
projects themselves. This complements the above discussion with similarities to the
urban renewal experience. As Chaplin et al point out,
"If owners [developers] can learn about the best use for their property
from the experience of neighboring properties, then they will have an
incentive to delay renting [pursuing]. They will play a waiting game,
hoping that... [another developer]...will be the first to commit their
property to a particular use and thereby generate the socially valuable
information concerning whether or not the property is well matched to
that use. Once a successful use is found, the uncommitted owners
[developers] will be able to use that information to improve the quality of
their decisions." 4
This has obvious relevance to the military base experience. These sites are very large
and as they become available to the private sector, they are usually wholly untested in a
market sense. This paper begins with the suspicion that developers contemplating
investing at bases consider these information externalities and that the lack of
information early in the reuse process may also affect the types of developers that are
willing to make investments.
12 Weymouth Naval Air Station is a military base located in Weymouth MA, A Boston suburb, which was
recently closed under BRAC 95.
13 William Gilligan, Interview with author, May 28, 1997.
" Chaplin, Andrew and Leahy, John, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search,
Working Paper, Columbia University & Harvard University, pg 3.
Infrastructure
As the federal government operated military bases, they were not required to abide by
local codes concerning roads, utilities, water, sewer, etc. In conventional private sector
sites, the infrastructure surrounding the sites is, by default, usually adequate. If they are
not, these are areas where developers generally negotiate with municipal authorities. By
virtue of their ability to grant and deny permits, municipalities wield considerable
weight in requiring developers to provide infrastructure upgrades and competitive
considerations incline developers to accept these demands. On bases, however, the
LRA (which in some sense is acting as a "municipality") is trying to attract developers
and therefore must provide attractive (i.e. "improved") sites. The question then arises
as to how important these infrastructure issues are, when are they important, and what
types are important?
Environmental Remediation
Historically, the United States Military has had a disgraceful record concerning
contamination of their sites with toxic substances. Furthermore, some sites also contain
(both above ground and buried) discarded live ordinance. As a result, virtually all
military bases contain some level of environmental contamination and there is also the
implicit fear that contamination will be found in the future on sites originally thought
clean.
Because owners of property have been held liable under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for
environmental hazards caused by previous owners, developers have been wary to acquire
sites at military installations where there is a perceived risk of liability. Recent changes
to the liability statutes, as well as liability assumed by the Department of Defense, are
mitigating this problem. However, questions remain. For instance, "who will be
responsible for the business interruption and potential liabilities that result from
additional cleanup activities resulting from previously unknown conditions and the
change in use of the property.""' This paper will review the issues developers face under
CERCLA with regard to military facilities and will attempt to uncover, from the
developer's perspective, the impact of these issues on the decision to acquire sites.
" Amos, Bruce, "The Application of Environmental Insurance in Redevelopment Associated With Military
Base Closures," The Real Estate Finance Journal, (Fall 1996), pg.80.
1.3 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1
Introduction. The questions the paper will explore will be introduced to set the tone for
the following chapters.
Chapter 2
Overview of the closure process. In order to provide the reader with a basic
understanding of the complexities of the base closure process and a familiarity with
terms (such as LRA, BRAC, etc.) so that the discussion that follows is in context, a
broad stroke summary of procedure will be provided. This is important as it relates to
timing. Furthermore, this summary will serve as a starting point for discussion under the
assumption that the base transfer has proceeded to a point where governmental and
statutory claims have been addressed and private developers are the acquisition agents.
Chapter 3
Charlestown Navy Yard. This case study will consist of an overview of the Charlestown
Navy Yard conversion followed by a discussion of issues (see above) faced by
developers both in the initial stages of the project and in current efforts. Charlestown
should provide valuable insight as it has been a benchmark success story. In hindsight,
this is not extraordinary given its location, but during the initial stages of development
uncertainty abounded. In this context, it should be helpful to compare Developers
experience today with that of twenty years ago.
Chapter 4
Lowry Air Force Base. Lowry has been held up as a recent shining example of base
planning, and given Denver's recent economic boom, Lowry's success at attracting
development is not surprising. This case study will explore the perspectives of
developers both pursuing and contemplating projects at Lowry. The current economic
vitality, coupled with ample alternative sites, makes an interesting backdrop.
Chapter 5
Watertown Arsenal. Although this site was a military facility and not a base per se, it
has all of the attendant procedural and policy characteristics that typify bases. This
site was chosen because a single developer16 was able to control the entire site and
succeeded in producing a highly successful project. Watertown's early reuse efforts,
however, were very unsuccessful. This case will hopefully provide insight as to what
issues surrounded this failure and ultimate success. Furthermore, it may provide a
different perspective as compared to the other sites as here a developer was able to act
as master developer and presumably internalize positive externalities.
Chapter 6
Analysis. The above questions will be revisited in the context of the central issues
through the research.
Chapter 7
Conclusions. Findings will be summarized and conclusions drawn with respect to
questions raised as well as a general discussion of "lessons learned".
1.4 Methodology
Research consisted of identifying military bases for case studies and conducting
interviews with base redevelopment staff and actual/potential private sector
developers. Predetermined questions designed to provide a consistent benchmark were
used as a framework to explore the issues noted above. Developers were queried as to
their experience on "conventional" sites to provide a standard against which their
experiences at the bases could be compared.
" New England Development
Chapter 2 Overview of Base Disposal/Reuse Process
2.0 Introduction
The current round of base closures is not without precedent, with President Kennedy
announcing the first large scale base reductions in 1961. Under that initiative, by 1990,
over 100 bases had been closed resulting in almost 100,000 civilian jobs lost and
137,000 military personnel relocated. Despite the often ominous rhetoric which typified
this politically volatile issue, however, reuses at these sites were fairly successful,
creating approximately 158,000 new civilian jobs.17
2.1 Process
Base closings originally fell under the auspices of The 1949 Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act, which gave responsibility for base disposal to the General
Services Administration (GSA), the traditional agent for federal property management
and transfer. The current round of base closings (those since 1988) was initiated by the
enacting of Public Law 100-526 in October 1988. Under this law, the Base Realignment
and Closure Commission (BRAC) was created and mandated to recommend domestic
bases for closure and realignment. Public Law 100-526 established BRAC as a one-time
only commission, which expired on December 31, 1988. As a result, upon expiration on
December 31, 1988 future base closings once again became governed by the procedures
mandated by section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code.
On November 5, 1990, President Bush signed Public Law 101-510, which created an
independent, five-year Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)
and specified base closure rounds in 1991, 1993 and 1995. Under Pub. L. 101-510, for
each round, the various services and Department of Defense (DoD) agencies submit
their candidates for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense for review. He,
in turn, then submits recommendations to DBCRC. On July 1, the Commission then
submits its report(s) and recommendations to the President, who, upon approval,
forwards the list to Congress. By doing nothing, Congress passively accepts the list.
" Civilian Reuse of Former Military Bases, 1961-1990: Summary of Completed Military Base Economic
Adjustment Projects, Office Of Economic Adjustment, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
(Washington, DC 1990).
" Department of Defense Base Reuse Implementation Manual, (Washington, DC 1995)
Rejection requires a joint resolution of disapproval. In 1991, the commission
recommended the closure of 34 bases and the realignment of 48 others. The 1993 and
1995 Commissions subsequently recommended an additional 61 closures and 39
realignments.'9
2.2 Implementation
Disposition of federal property has traditionally been executed by the GSA under the
Surplus Property Act of 1944 and the 1949 Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act. In 1988, the Base Closure and Realignment Act shifted this responsibility
to the DoD. Under this law, all property must be sold at market value with funds
obtained from the sale or lease to be deposited into a "base closure account" that is
used to defray expenses related to closing bases nationwide. This strategy to try to
realize "market value" is significant and is a "departure from base closure procedures
used in the 1960s and 1970s when many closed military bases often were turned over to
local and state governments for as little as $1.",20
Once a base has been selected and approved for closure, and no other military
departments have laid claim to it, disposition of the base must pass through a hierarchy
of potential users. Federal agencies share first claim along with homeless assistance use
under the McKinney Act." Once these claims have been satisfied, the site (or remaining
portion) is deemed to be "surplus" and offered to state and local governments.
Typically, state and local governments acquire sites through either public conveyances or
negotiated sales. Changes implemented by the Clinton administration and the Pryor
Amendments to the 1994 Defense Authorization Bill have both reduced the screening
process time and provided a mechanism to transfer bases to state or local government
for economic development "at or below the estimated fair market value of the property
transferred or without consideration".22  By utilizing these "economic development
conveyances", communities, even if unable to pay market value, are able to acquire sites
19 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 1995 Report to the President, (Washington, DC
1995).
21 Gsottschneider, Richard et at, "Acquiring Property at a Former Military Base: The Process and the Law,"
Real Estate Issues, (April 1994).
21 See Section 2.5 for a discussion of the McKinney Act and exemption under the Base Closure Community
Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994.
22 Title XXIX, Section 2903.
and save millions of dollars in acquisition costs. For example, "at Fort Devons, the
Massachusetts Land Bank is negotiating a conveyance under a master lease where there
is no acquisition cost but the Land Bank and the U.S. Army will share proceeds from
future asset sales."23
2.3 Phases of Implementation 4
Before federal property can actually be transferred, it must go through a complex
process of disposal implementation that consists of three basic phases;
Base-Wide Reuse Planning
In this phase, most activities are mandated by law. Generally, this phase begins at the
approval date for the closure and ends when the Local Reuse Authority's(LRA's) 2 ' reuse
plan has been submitted to the Military Department. Concurrently, the Military
Department must complete the following tasks; 2
* Identify installation property, which is excess to DoD's needs and surplus to the
Federal Government's needs, that will be made available for reuse.
. Inventory personal property and consult with the LRA to identify the personal
property that will be made available to the LRA for reuse.
* Determine and analyze environmental impacts that may occur as a result of its
disposal.
. Identify potentially impacted natural or cultural resources on the property and any
mitigation measures that may have to be taken.
" Conduct an Environmental Baseline Survey (EBS) to identify the environmental
condition of the installation property, including property that is uncontaminated
and can be made available for reuse without further environmental actions.
* Refocus current environmental cleanup, compliance, and natural and cultural
resources strategies and schedules in light of the LRA's land-use plan and
redevelopment priorities.
" Relocate active mission elements (mission drawdown).
23 Seidman, Karl, "Redeveloping Military Bases," Commentary, Summer 1995, pg. 11.
24 See Department of Defense Base Reuse Manual. Some passages reprinted.
25 See Section 2.4 for a discussion of LRAs.
26 Department of Defense Base Reuse Manual, (Washington, DC, 1995).
* Plan for and carry out protection and maintenance (caretaking) of installation
property and facilities not immediately reused at the time of active mission
departure/ base closure.
Reuse planning activities, whenever possible, are conducted concurrently and are
grouped into four principal categories; 27
1. Comprehensive land-use and redevelopment planning, including LRA formation,
recognition, and reuse planning activities, Military Department/LRA community
interface activities, and Military Department disposal planning activities (including
interim leasing of facilities no longer needed by the active mission), conducted to
assist the LRA reuse planning efforts.
2. Environmental Impact and other impact analysis.28
3. The BRAC Environmental Process, including environmental baseline surveys and
environmental cleanup activities.29
4. Installation Management, including active mission drawdown, protection and
maintenance of facilities, and caretakers operations.
Disposal Decision Making
This phase consists of the Military department's disposal decision and the LRA's reuse
decision. The LRA will submit its plan to the DoD and if the LRA's plan contains
provisions for the homeless, an application to the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) will be made. The Military Department will then, after completing
its NEPA analysis, issue final disposal decisions.
Parcel-by Parcel decision Implementation
After environmental remedial actions have been taken to comply with the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) as amended, the Military Department will dispose of the property in
accordance with its disposal decisions and as described in Section 2.6.2.
27 Ibid.
28 See Section 2.6 for discussion of environmental issues at bases.
29 Ibid.
2.4 Local Reuse (Redevelopment) Authority (LRA)
Base reuse activities are generally orchestrated by a Local Reuse (Redevelopment)
Authority (LRA). The LRA is a local governmental or quasi - governmental organization
that usually has the sole responsibility for the planning and reuse of the site as well as
acting as the communities' point of contact regarding the closure. Furthermore, the LRA
is "expected to provide leadership and build consensus for base reuse"
LRAs are encouraged to bring together diverse interests representing political, economic
and community interests. Because base reuse is typically a politically and socially
sensitive topic, the LRA should have "the complete support of local jurisdictions and
interest groups, who speak with one voice though the designated LRA. This key factor
,31
is more important in recognizing an LRA than any procedural step".
Once commissioned, the LRA becomes, in essence, a master developer. LRAs do,
however, have tremendous flexibility with regard to how they execute and manage this
mandate. This point is non-trivial, as evidence (discussed later) suggests that the
private sector plays close attention to how the LRA's authority is exercised.
2.5 Homeless Assistance
During all of the base closure rounds since 1988, LRAs have had to wrestle with
provisions designed to address the needs of the homeless. This issue was first
addressed by Title V of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 19872 by
making service of the needs of the homeless the first priority of all surplus federal
property, including military installations. While Title V successfully executed its
mandate with respect to small parcels, it quickly became apparent that it was not
sufficiently flexible to address the huge sites comprising base closures and did not
adequately represent all of the multiple interests involved."
3 Community Guide to Base Reuse, (Washington, DC, 1995).
' Ibid.
3 42 U.S.C. 11411
" Department of Housing and Urban Development, 24 CFR part 586
Congress, recognizing these problems, in 1994 enacted The Base Closure Community
Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act" which exempts 1995 BRAC Commission
installations from the provisions of Title V of the McKinney Act and substitutes a
community based process where the LRA, community groups, and representatives of the
homeless participate in local reuse planning. Additionally, it establishes a process
whereby 1988, 91, and 93 BRAC Commission installations are able to elect to be treated
under this new process. Under this Act, the LRA is responsible for developing a reuse
plan that "appropriately balances the needs" of the various communities, businesses
and developers, and homeless assistance. Once this balance has been achieved, the
LRA then submits its reuse plan to HUD to determine its compliance with the statute.
2.6 Environmental Issues & Remediation
Environmental liabilities associated with military bases have been cited in the past as
hampering redevelopment efforts "because they [developers] fear they will be held liable
for the cleanups under CERCLA." 36  Likewise, developers interviewed expressed
concerns over the potential for incurring either direct liabilities for environmental
contamination or indirect costs associated with their removal (e.g. delays, cost overruns,
lost business, etc.). Therefore, an overview of environmental procedures and liabilities
surrounding base reuse is important to understanding these issues facing developers.
In the past, the federal government has been cavalier in its use and disposal of
hazardous substances. Causes of contamination range from the passive, such as leaking
underground oil and gas tanks or runoff from cleaning facilities, to the almost criminal37
dumping of toxic and radioactive wastes. In fact, "the first 86 bases that were slated
for closure contained over 500 individual hazardous waste sites that had to be cleaned
up , and 15 of these bases have been placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) or
superfund list."38As it turns out, "federal facilities are among our worst polluters".39
Furthermore, some bases also contain live ordinance buried in undocumented locations.
" Pub. L. 101-510
1 Department of Housing and Urban Development, 24 CFR part 586
36 Schnapf, Larry, "Sales of Military Bases and Surplus Supplies Pose Environmental Traps," The Real
Estate Finance Journal, (Winter 1994), pg. 24.
" In many instances a private citizen or corporation behaving similarly would, in fact, face criminal
penalties.
38 Schnapf, Larry, "Sales of Military Bases and Surplus Supplies Pose Environmental Traps," The Real
Estate Finance Journal, (Winter 1994), pg.24.
2.6.1 Legislation
Responsibility for environmental cleanup falls primarily under the auspices of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),'
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), and the National
Contingency Plan (NCP)." Consistent with CERCLA's "polluter pays" philosophy, the
DoD, under section 120 of CERCLA, is responsible for remediating all environmental
damage it has created through its activities. 2 The DoD is also responsible for cleaning
up past contamination, regardless of when it is identified, and for meeting the
requirements of any new federal or state cleanup standards and laws." However, the
large number of individual toxic sites many bases contain, coupled with insufficient
funding of the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA)", make complete
remediation of a base tremendously time consuming and in some cases all but
impossible. Furthermore, CERCLA requires that the military complete remediation of
the entire site prior to disposal, thereby delaying redevelopment efforts on those portions
of the base that are uncontaminated or already remediated. The passage of the 1992
Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA)" addressed this problem
by allowing the base to be, in essence, subdivided, and the uncontaminated parcels
conveyed for development. This allows reuse efforts to proceed and parcels to be
transferred even though remediation efforts may be incomplete.
2.6.2 Process
Prior to making a final disposal decision, the Military Department, under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),46 "must consider all reasonable disposal alternatives
and their respective environmental consequences...[and] ...analyze impacts to natural
and cultural resources (e.g., historic structures, wetlands, threatened and endangered
' Rubenson, David and Anderson, John, California Base Closure: Lessons for DoD's Cleanup Program,
National Defense research Institute, 1995.
40 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.
4 ' Rubenson, David and Anderson, John, California Base Closure: Lessons for DoD's Cleanup Program,
National Defense research Institute, 1995.
42 This does not, however, necessarily provide a panacea for developers acquiring these sites (see Section
5.2.5).
4 Environmental Impact at Closing Installations, General Accounting Office/NSAID-95-70, 1995
" DERA is an account funded by the defense appropriation process as CERCLA's Superfund is not
available to the DoD.
45 PUB .L. No. 102-426, 106 Stat. 2175.
46 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
species, Native American sites and others)..."" This analysis typically takes the form of
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
While NEPA addresses the environmental impact of the proposed use(s) on the site, of
far greater relevance to base reuse is the site's environmental impact upon the uses. In
other words, does the site contain contaminated areas and how/when will they be
remediated? Environmental programs are executed through the BRAC Environmental
Process, which includes addressing environmental issues as well as executing cleanup
activities. Ideally, communication between the Military Department and the LRA will
ensure that reuse planning is compatible with the environmental conditions and that
cleanup priorities can be established to reflect current and anticipated land uses.48
The Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) requires that "all DoD
installations (active, closed, or realigned) proceed expeditiously to remediate
environmental contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants
due to past practices. This includes accommodating environmental response processes
under other federal and state statutes, as appropriate."4" DERP establishes guidelines
designed to meet three objectives:"
1. The identification, investigation, research and development , and cleanup of
contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.
2. Correction of other environmental damage (such as detection and disposal of
unexploded ordinance) that creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or to the environment.
3. Demolition and removal of buildings and structures that pose an immediate threat to
health and safety.
The BRAC environmental planning process consists of five principal steps."
* A BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) is established which works closely with the LRA and
coordinates the cleanup activities.
" The BCT reviews the LRA's redevelopment plan and the status of all environmental
programs.
7 Department of Defense Base Reuse Manual, (Washington DC, 1995)
41 Ibid.
49 Fact Sheet, Air Force Base Conversion Agency, Department of the Air Force, (Washington, DC, 1997).
50 Ibid.
' Department of Defense Base Reuse Manual, (Washington DC, 1995).
* A BRAC Cleanup Plan (BCP) is prepared, describing the status of base
environmental programs, and identifying strategies and schedules for integrating the
environmental cleanup with the community reuse plan.
* As contamination is remediated, the BCP is updated to reflect cleanup and site
close-out actions that have been taken, as well as any changes in community
redevelopment needs.
Of primary concern to end users of former base properties are the environmental issues
concerning the sites they acquire. Providing this information, The Environmental
Baseline Survey (EBS) is a mandated report that is "generally intended to be a thorough
review and compilation of environmental records and other activities related to the
environmental condition of the property as of the date of the EBS report . The EBS report
satisfies a number of requirements including; notification of transferees of storage,
release, or disposal of hazardous substances as required by CERCLA, identification of
uncontaminated property under the provisions of CERFA (at CERCLA 120(h)(4)), and
supporting the preparation of Findings of Suitability to Lease (FOSLs) and Findings of
Suitability to Transfer(FOSTs) in support of real estate transactions. Furthermore,
DoD relies on the EBS report as a key element in satisfying its due diligence requirements
for real estate transactions."
Once it has been determined that the property is environmentally suitable (i.e.
uncontaminated or remediated) the DoD (or military department executing the transfer)
will issue a FOST or FOSL." Because a transfer of real property by deed cannot be
made until environmental cleanup is completed, or a cleanup remedy is in place and
operating successfully, it has become common practice to lease property in anticipation
of transfer." This has been an important means of facilitating redevelopment efforts
while environmental restoration continues and before a FOST has been issued.56
" Air Force Base Conversion Handbook, BRAC 95 Update, Department of the Air Force, (Washington,
DC, 1995).
* This point is quite significant as while the DoD views the EBS report as satisfying its due diligence
requirements, a purchaser may not necessarily rely on it [EBS report] as due diligence with regard to an
"innocent purchaser defense" to CERCLA 107 liability. See Section 5.2.5.
" If a FOST cannot be made but the parcel may be leased as permitted by law, a FOSL may be issued.
* Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 1995 Report to the President, (Washington, DC
1995).
56 This is not without implication to private sector investment, however. See Section 5.2.5.
CHAPTER 3 CHARLESTOWN NAVY YARD
3.0 Introduction
On July 1, 1974, the U.S. Navy formally closed the Charlestown Navy Yard (the Yard),
ending a 174 year relationship with Charlestown and the City of Boston. What was
once the employment home of over 50,000 people at its peak, now lay fallow. As
described by Robert Kenney, the former director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA), the once bustling home of the U.S.S. Constitution17 had been reduced to an
"inaccessible run down industrial site consisting of derelict piers, crumbling buildings
and environmental hazards."58
Although the Yard represented potentially prime real estate, and history has borne this
out, in 1974 the Yard's future appeared quite uncertain. The nation was in the midst of
a recession and the pundits were speaking of the demise of the historic northeast power
centers of industry and commerce. Furthermore, although the Yard was just a stone's
throw from downtown Boston across the harbor, it was, in fact, quite inaccessible as it
lacked service by public transportation and adequate roads.
Yet, the Yard's redevelopment has been tremendously successful and has received
national accolades. Approximately 3,000 permanent jobs have been created while
ongoing construction provides close to 2,000 more. 1,086 housing units have been
completed, including 323 affordable units, which, when combined with office and retail
uses, add up to over 2.5 million square feet. The project is not yet complete, with an
additional 2.3 million square feet of mixed-use development planned or under
construction.59
3.1 History
The Charlestown Navy Yard had faced threats of closure since the 1930's. In the
aftermath of renewed closure threats in the 1960's stemming from the Kennedy
Administration's base closure initiative, the Charlestown Historical Society moved to
" The U.S.S. Constitution ("Old Ironsides") is the oldest commissioned warship ( 1797) in the world and
resided (and still resides) at the Charlestown Navy Yard.
5 Robert Kenney, Interview with author, (June 26, 1997).
* Karen, Victor, "The Charlestown Navy Yard," Commentary, (Fall, 1994).
have the Yard recognized as a National Historic Monument and placed on the National
Register of Historic Places. In 1966, they succeeded. A few years later, sparked by a
September, 1969 article in the Boston Globe, a movement was begun to create a park at
the Navy Yard that was centered around the U.S.S. Constitution.0
In April, 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Charlestown Navy Yard,
among others, would be closed. Initially, The Boston Economic Development and
Industrial Commission was designated as the agency responsible for the planning and
conversion of the site with the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) acting in an
advisory capacity. Ultimately, however, it became apparent that the BRA, given its
experience with redevelopment projects, was far better equipped to manage the Yard's
conversion/redevelopment and the BRA acquired 105 acres of the 135 acre site from the
GSA 61 in 1976.
As portions of the site had been declared a National Historic Monument and some of
the buildings historically and architecturally significant, 2 the BRA acquired 31 acres
(the Historic Monument Area) for 1$ pursuant to Section 2039(K)(3) of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 with the stipulation that the site be
reused with an eye to preserving historic resources. Under the provisions of this
transfer, the BRA is prohibited from subsequent transfers to third parties and therefore
uses ground leases to facilitate transfer of control to private developers. Another 16
acres was also acquired for $1 to establish Shipyard Park and 30 acres was conveyed6 3
to the National Park Service to Establish the U.S.S. Constitution National Park. The
remaining 58 acres of the site (known as the New Development Area) was purchased
from the GSA for 1.74 million dollars.64
Initial reuse plans were aimed at directly mitigating jobs lost due to the base's shutdown
by calling for significant industrial and light industrial uses. Specifically, it was
proposed that shipbuilding activities be sought which would re-hire workers laid off by
the Navy and would require little public investment as the required infrastructure was
already in place. Towards this end, a deal was eventually struck with the Boston
60 McCleary, Oren, A National Park for Charlestown, (Boston, 1975).
61 Robert Kenney, Interview with author, (June 26, 1997)
62 Several building had been designed by noted architect Alexander Parris, who also had designed Quincy
Market.
63 By public Conveyance, see Section 2.2.
64 Karen, Victor, "The Charlestown Navy Yard," Commentary, (Fall, 1994).
Shipbuilding Corporation to locate at the Yard under the condition that it could secure
enough shipbuilding contracts.
Unfortunately, American shipbuilding in general, and New England shipbuilding in
particular, was in its twilight, and Boston Shipbuilding's failure in 1975 to secure the
prerequisite contracts was an indication of the demise befalling the U.S. shipping
industry.
Hopes then settled upon attracting the Kennedy Museum to the Yard. Although the
library would not create any jobs to speak of and would not contribute tax revenues, it
was felt that the museum would attract tourists as well as lend credibility to the Yard as
a desirable site. At this time at the end of 1975, the BRA officially took over as the
agency in charge of the Yard's redevelopment. The BRA quickly refocused reuse
planning on creating a mixed-use masterplan that exploited both the waterfront location
and the site's historical character. They [BRA] hoped that the Kennedy Museum would
be the first step in attracting development to the Yard. This hope was to be frustrated,
however, as the Kennedy Museum chose to locate at the University of Massachusetts.
3.2 Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)65
The Boston Redevelopment Authority was established in 1957 by the Boston City
Council and the Massachusetts Legislature to assume the development powers
previously held by the Boston Housing Authority. These powers were also expanded to
areas other than publicly-assisted housing and in 1960, the City Planning Board was
abolished and its powers transferred to the BRA.
During the next ten years, the BRA concerned itself first with large downtown renewal
projects and then with more than 20 neighborhood urban renewal areas. Its role was
restricted as a matter of policy to residential and commercial development.
In 1971, the Economic Development and Industrial Corporation (EDIC) was created to
promote industrial development and in 1990 also assumed responsibility of job-training,
job placement, and other human services programs. Beginning in 1993, the BRA and
EDIC were functionally merged.
* Taken from the BRA on-line (web) information, (July 1997).
3.3 Immobliare New England (INE)
Immobliare New England (INE) was the American subsidiary of Societa Generale
Immobliare of Rome created expressly to operate the Charlestown Navy Yard project.
Societa Generale Immobliare of Rome, a joint venture between an Italian based real
estate developer and Italian construction company, was no stranger to ambitious U.S.
development, having completed such notable projects as the Watergate Hotel in
Washington and Marina Del Rey in California.
INE was attracted to the Navy Yard primarily because of its location, and specifically
because of the "tremendous development potential we recognized that the site's
complete access to the water afforded," says Paul Davis, former president of INE. This
potential was by no means universally believed, however, as no local, or other,
developers had expressed serious interest in pursuing the 58 acre parcel known as the
New Development Area. In fact, conventional wisdom at the time considered
Charlestown a "tough neighborhood," says Davis, which was compounded by the
Yard's inaccessibility and lack of public transportation. Davis suggests that the lack of
interest by other developers was the result of their concentration on Boston CBD and
waterfront projects, having not taken the time and/or lacking the analytical
sophistication to consider a deal with perhaps more subtle potential.
Whereas others saw few redeeming features at the Yard, INE saw apartments and a
marina. Very Important to INE was that they control a large enough site so that they
could build enough apartments and able to "create a neighborhood." Since they were to
be the first developers at the Yard, Davis says that they had to be assured that they had
enough "critical mass to determine their own destiny." Davis also says that they even
put a positive spin on the site's inaccessibility, feeling that the two obscure entrances
and fences with barbed wire would provide a "buffer" between the site and the "tough
neighborhoods." They felt that if they invested in security and received support from
the BRA, they could "secure the site."
Negotiation
Despite the fact that INE felt bullish about the potential for development at the Yard,
they were also aware of it detractions. Davis recalls that they were prepared to proceed
with the project, but only under the right circumstances. Negotiations centered on INE
feeling comfortable that the BRA's incentives were aligned with theirs, and that the BRA
was fully committed to the project. This took its form as two issues, financing and
infrastructure.
With regard to the latter, INE insisted that the BRA provide certain infrastructure
investments. These took the form of streets, sidewalks, landscaping and utilities. Also,
it was important to INE that the BRA move ahead swiftly with its plans in the Historic
Monument Area. INE felt that much of the appeal to living at the yard was going to be
the Yard's waterfront and historic components, and they wanted to make sure that
these amenities were going to be in place when they marketed their product. Because the
BRA was "committed to sparking development" at the yard, "a lot came out of those
negotiations," says Davis. In addition to providing the infrastructure improvements,
the BRA also agreed to a schedule for those improvements which, if not met, would
trigger a refund of INE's money with interest.
INE and the BRA also agreed on a unique financing agreement. Under this agreement,
INE lent to the BRA the $1.74 million dollars for the BRA's purchase of the New
Development Area from the GSA. Each parcel to be developed was then assigned a
value, and as that parcel was developed, the valued amount was deducted from the
remaining balance owed to INE. Also, as mentioned above, if the BRA failed to meet its
infrastructure commitments, INE was entitled to have their remaining investment
returned with interest (two points over prime). On the other hand, if the development
proceeded smoothly, the accrued interest was forgiven. Furthermore, there was a
development goal set that provided for the BRA to receive a percentage of project
profits if these goals were met. These provisions created a unique set of incentives that
enabled INE to reach a "comfort level" sufficient to justify pursuing the project. As
Davis said,
"the financing agreement gave us a lot of leverage because you had a
situation where the city is on the books owing a developer all of this
money plus accruing interest...this gave us relative assurance that the city
and administration would cooperate as much as possible and get things
done on a timely basis."66
Another dimension that Davis says was critical in arriving at an agreement, was that the
Land Disposition Agreement be flexible enough to modify once the project was
66 Davis, Paul, Interview with author, (July 21, 1997).
underway. Davis feels that this flexibility is a critical issue. An example of this
flexibility is evidenced by the provision in the agreement regarding elderly housing.
Davis notes, "as with most planned, large scale development under a municipal
authority, the municipality or agency generally requires the developer to provide or
subsidize some type of public good." At the Yard, the BRA wanted INE to provide
elderly housing. Yet, rather than mandating it with a rigid requirement or obligation, the
agreement called for a "best effort" on the part of INE. This, Davis says. "made us
comfortable because we knew that if the subsidies or market did not materialize, we
would not be held to the cross."
Also a significant determinant of INE's faith in the viability of the project was the BRA's
plan, responsibility, and commitment to developing the historical areas as well as their
commitment to Boston's waterfront. This combination of amenities, INE believed,
would attract people to the Yard and provide focus. Davis points out that it is
"important to note that a private developer would not necessarily have the incentive,
and probably not the ability, to provide large public goods."67
3.4 Kenney Development Company, Inc.
Kenney Development was founded in 1977 by Robert Kenney and specializes in
"planning, developing and managing complex urban development and redevelopment
projects, in its own right or consulting to others." 6 Mr. Kenney has had a long history
with development and redevelopment in Boston, serving as Director of Boston's Public
Facilities Commission from 1968-1970, and as the Director of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority from 1971-1976.
Bob Kenney was also one of the first developers to pursue commercial development at
the Charlestown Yard where he was involved with the speculative redevelopment of
Buildings 33, 34, 38 and 39 in the Historic Transfer Monument Area. Kenney became
involved with the project after being approached by a business group that held the
development rights to the site. As he recalled,
67 Davis, Paul, Interview with author, (July 28, 1997).
6' Taken from Robert Kenney's resume, provided by Mr. Kenney.
"I was approached by this community group that had been previously
designated as developer. The BRA had advertised these buildings for
development and a group of local business men put a proposal together
and they were designated as the developer. They came to me to see if I
could do the project as they had had another development consultant but
he couldn't or didn't get it started. I was able to get it started.""
Kenney was a logical choice to contact as he, as director of the BRA, had negotiated the
transfer and early planning of the Yard.
While Kenney had been searching for projects to get involved with and looking at other
sites, the Navy Yard was attractive for several reasons. Kenney had specialized in old
or historic buildings and he saw an opportunity to apply his experience and competitive
advantage with these types of projects at these buildings. The site's "unique campus
like setting close to downtown" also appealed to him.
Because the site had been part of a Historical Conveyance (see Section 3.1), the
buildings could only be developed and operated under a ground lease. Furthermore, the
BRA provided the lease for 37.5 cents per square foot during construction and 75 cents
per square foot after completion which was extremely inexpensive, even by 1983
standards. The BRA was then able to share in the upside of the deal if it was successful
by participating in a percentage of the profits once a predetermined benchmark had been
reached. As Kenney says, "they [BRA] made it financially very attractive with the
combination of the ground lease and the fact we did not have to provide any tenant
buildout until the spaces were leased. This limited our exposure."
It was also important to Kenney that the BRA had already made a significant
investment in infrastructure at the Yard. This included roads, sidewalks, landscaping,
and investment in the park areas. Perhaps more importantly, housing had already been
built and people had begun to live at the Yard. This, Kenney says, "was an indication
that people wanted to be there--well, live there at least. This was important."
While the site was attractive, Kenney says that he remained apprehensive. With regard
to his project's proposed uses, namely office and retail, the Yard remained untested.
Also, of major concern, was that the site was not easily serviced by public/rapid
transit. He says that without public transit, he felt that it would be difficult to
"convince tenants to locate there--especially back office operations."
69 Kenney, Robert, Interview with author, (June, 26, 1997).
Kenney had no reservations with regard to working under the authority of the BRA. Not
only was he intimately familiar with its people and procedures, but he felt, "confident
that I had enough flexibility once I got underway to keep me from getting nervous." In
fact, the BRA, under his stewardship, had negotiated with the DoD to acquire the
historic buildings pre-approved for use, rather than having to go individually before the
Department of the Interior, to allow flexibility in the planning process as events
developed. Moreover, because of the type of projects he had experience working on, he
felt comfortable with "complex deals."
Flexibility was to prove very important to Kenney. Initially, the BRA had designated
that all of the historic buildings contain retail spaces on their first floors with office
space above. Yet market realities prevailed as it became apparent that the Yard was
not going to be a retail destination and retail tenants did not lease the space. Kenney
was having success attracting office tenants, however. The BRA "recognized this reality"
and subsequently allowed Kenney to put office on the first floor.
The BRA also proved helpful in establishing the viability of the project by leasing office
space themselves as well as by facilitating the Massachusetts Water Resource
Authority's lease of a large block of space. By helping to occupy space, Kenney says
that "other tenants felt more comfortable about leasing space themselves."
Going Forward
Kenney Development is currently looking at the option to develop Building 105, which
Bob Kenney refers to as a "real turkey." He would like to "do some housing," given the
extremely tight Boston housing market but has been frustrated by toxic contamination.
Building 105 is historically significant as it once housed the famous Charlestown Navy
Yard Chain Forge. It is also significant in that it is heavily contaminated with Asbestos
and PCB's. Kenney says that although the DoD is responsible for the clean up, "you
never know how long it will take for them to get around to it and it might take them
forever to do it." Frustrated by waiting, and anxious to pursue what he believes is
currently a good project, he explored the possibility of doing the clean up himself. This,
however, proved impractical as the cleanup is particularly expensive due to the
requirement that the Forge be kept as a museum and therefore retained intact and
cleaned. Also, he is insecure as to his liability if he does the clean up himself. He feels
that both he and the DoD would be well served to provide a mechanism to allow
private developers to remediate the site and be reimbursed by the DoD.
3.5 Raymond Property Company, LLC
The Raymond Company was founded by Neil St. John (Ted) Raymond in 1969, and has
been a significant presence in Boston real estate. They are especially noted for their
adaptive reuse of historic buildings. Among their more celebrated projects are the
Lincolnshire Hotel Building, 277 Dartmouth Street, the Exeter Street Theater, and the
Frederick Ames Webster House.
James English, Raymond Company's Director of Planning and Operations and one of the
firm's partners, has a unique perspective on the Yard's redevelopment. Not only has he
has been involved with the Raymond Company's efforts there, but he also worked for
the BRA in the early 1980's as Project Coordinator for the Navy Yard and ultimately as
the Deputy Director of Harbor Planning and Development.
Raymond Company first became involved at the Yard with the redevelopment of
Building 149, which had originally been undertaken by the Congress Group but had
barely gotten underway by them when they decided to sell out. Building 149 was a
proposed speculative office building of approximately 600,000 square feet. Jim English
remembers,
"Ted Raymond felt that there was potential at the Navy Yard for office
development although at this time it was still fairly untested. Bob
Kenney had completed some space and had leases with the BRA and the
Massachusetts Water Resource Authority and it was important that there
were some tenants."70
Agreement
The agreement reached with the BRA was based primarily on financial incentives.
English says that the BRA had already "demonstrated its commitment to the Yard,"
and that much of the infrastructure improvements had been completed. Therefore,
negotiations centered around financing. "Unlike most private sector acquisitions,"
English says, "financial terms were negotiated... [and]...projects at the yard were
7" English, James, Interview with author, (June 23, 1997).
typically not a bid situation but rather based upon the merits of the proposal and
whether that guy or team had the where-with-all to execute and complete the project."
Building 149 was also part of the Historical Conveyance (as was the Kenney site
discussed above) and therefore also subject to a ground lease. Again, the BRA offered a
very attractive lease as incentive to Raymond's developing the site. They also structured
the agreement so that the BRA would share in the upside of any profits Raymond
realized. This, English says, "was important in ensuring that the BRA was interested in
the project's success."
English says that flexibility once the project got underway was also crucial. Building
149 had been designed by Alexander Parris, the architect of Boston's Faneuil Hall, and
under the terms of the Historic Conveyance and subsequent agreement with Raymond
Company, it had to be restored. Yet because of the building's condition, combined with
restrictions imposed by current building codes, a true restoration was financially
unfeasible. As English explained,
"The only way we were going to be able to do the job was to take the
whole building apart and rebuild it our way and then make it look the
same. That was quite all right with the BRA and everyone else because
they were in a development mode to get things done, not bust peoples
chops."
The project became a resounding success when Raymond Company leased space to the
Massachusetts General Hospital's (MGH) Research Department. MGH, recognizing that
they had begun to fall behind in research and were confined with regard to space in
Boston, decided to invest heavily in a state of the art research facility at the Yard. They
then convinced the head of Cancer Research to locate there, promising him virtually
anything he wanted. As English points out, "MGH sort of repeated the BRA's
experience of spending some money and giving the first guy in everything he wanted,
then everyone else wanted to be there." Importantly, MGH also established their own
transit system to service the Yard which proved to be a tremendous attraction for future
tenants. "MGH just created a huge engine for economic development," says English.
Also responsible for their project's and, ultimately, the Yard's success, English believes,
was the very successful exploitation of the waterfront and historical amenities. The
park, U.S.S. Constitution, and waterfront not only make the Yard a destination, he says,
but they also create a "valuable space. People will always pay a premium to live or
work on the water."
Ongoing development
By the mid 1980's, not only had the Yard begun to prove itself as a viable location, but
Boston was also experiencing an unprecedented economic and real estate boom. Now
the tide began to shift as developers began to compete for sites at the Yard. Whereas
developers once asked the BRA what they were going to do for them, the leverage had
turned where the BRA now asked the developers what they would provide. By this
time, Raymond Company had also bought out INE's interest at the Yard. English
remembered, "they [BRA] began asking, what streets are you going to build? What
linkage are you going to provide? What programs in Charlestown are you going to
support?" Because the market was strong and the Yard had now proven itself,
developers responded.
With the real estate crash of the late 1980's and early 1990's, the situation reversed
itself. Once again, the BRA was looking for developers. English recalls that the BRA
came to them and said, "come take Building 75." Raymond Company, however, was
also considering buildings in Charlestown that the banks had foreclosed on and were
anxious to dispose of. Recognizing this, the BRA again offered to "participate" with a
very attractive financial package (low ground lease) and a share in the potential upside
of future profits. Furthermore, when Raymond suggested that they did not want to
provide any roads or participate in linkage programs, "the BRA said, 'no, none of that,
just come here and we will move you through the process smoothly and quickly.' And
that is exactly what happened," English says.
English feels that it is just this type of flexibility which has made the BRA so successful
in redeveloping the Yard. Furthermore, it was, and is, the reason that Raymond
Company is able to successfully participate. English says, "the BRA is somewhat
unique in this country in that it is both the planning authority and the development
authority in one board. You have the same group encouraging development as making
the planning and zoning decisions...that foresight was just so brilliant."
CHAPTER 4 LOWRY AIR FORCE BASE
4.0 Introduction
When, in the fall of 1991, Denver learned that Lowry Air Force Base was targeted in the
BRAC 91 round of closures, it did not come as a surprise. Not only was the base
obsolete" and had been slated for closure once before (in 1976), but a feeble attempt at
saving the base had been attempted in 1990.
With mitigating the negative impacts of the base's closure in mind, reuse efforts have
been impressive. Lowry has received national attention for the speed and efficiency in
which it has developed and implemented its reuse plan. As James Meadows, Executive
Director of the Lowry Redevelopment Authority proudly claims, Lowry "has moved
faster from closure to reuse than any other military facility, with innovative plans for
land acquisition, housing for the homeless, and financing--is a role model for base
redevelopment."72  Lowry's impressive reuse plan calls for 800 acres of open space
including 45 holes of public golf, an ice arena, a business/town center that includes an
urban office park, independent and assisted care housing for seniors, a college campus
for 10,000 students, and two residential neighborhoods with over 3,000 single family
houses.
Unlike the Charlestown Navy Yard, Lowry has had the good fortune to have its reuse
plan met by a healthy economy. Moreover, The Denver metro area has been experiencing
explosive growth on a local level and these have combined to help Lowry generate
promising early results.
4.1 History
The 1,866 acre Lowry Air Force Base was commissioned in 1937 in what was then the
rural outskirts of Denver. Lowry is perhaps best known as President Eisenhower's
summer White House from 1953 to 1955. Lowry was also the original home of the U.S.
Air Force Academy which was dedicated there in 1955.
" Although an Air Force Base, the base's runways had been decommissioned in 1965 in the aftermath of
protests sparked by the crash of a military plane in a Denver Backyard. The base was subsequently used as a
training facility.
72 Meadows, James, Lowry, "A Role Model for Base Redevelopment," Urban Land, (March 1997), pg.26.
Once the base's closure became certain in late 1991, the communities of Denver and
Aurora responded by signing an intergovernmental agreement creating the Lowry
Economic Recovery Project (LERP). While only 11 percent of the site lay in neighboring
Aurora, Denver's recognition of Aurora's economic stake in redevelopment efforts was
critical in establishing an early broad base of support that would facilitate agreement in
the arduous reuse planning process. This swift response was instrumental in the
delivering to the Air Force of a clear plan that, in turn, enabled the Air Force to complete
the requisite Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and deliver a decision on property
disposition sixty days in advance of the actual closure of the base.'
In 1994, the Air Force issued a Record of Decision (ROD) approving the proposed
Lowry reuse plan, while Denver and Aurora signed a second intergovernmental
agreement establishing the Lowry Redevelopment Authority. The Lowry Redevelopment
Authority is an independent public entity or LRA (see Section 2.4) that serves as the
master planner and developer of Lowry. As Meadows says, "the LRA [Lowry
Redevelopment Authority74 ] is accountable to the public but retains discretion to
redevelop the site more like a private enterprise, albeit for a public purpose."'75
At this same time, as per the federal, state and local screening process (see Section 2.2),
the LERP recommended, and the air force accepted, public benefit conveyances to the
American Red Cross, Community College and Occupational Education System,
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver General Hospital, Colorado
Department of Health (lab facility), Belle Bonfils Blood Bank, City of Aurora Parks,
Emily Grifith Opportunity School, Lowry Heritage Museum, and the Colorado Historical
Society. In regard to a request by the Denver Sheriff's Office for a correctional facility,
the LERP strongly recommended against it and the offer was ultimately withdrawn.76
Denver, Aurora and the LERP struggled with requests for homeless assistance under the
terms of the McKinney Act (see Section 2.5). While the LERP recommended that no
more than 86 family units and 87 rooms for individuals be dispersed, phased in, and
" Ibid.
74 In the discussion of base reuse, LRA generally refers to Local Redevelopment or Reuse Authority. The
Lowry redevelopment Authority also uses this acronym. To avoid confusion, references to LRA in this
paper refer to the former.
" Meadows, James, Lowry, "A Role Model for Base Redevelopment," Urban Land, (March 1997).
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managed with market-rate rental housing by a common management company, the
Department of Health and Human Services approved the award of 196 family and 109
individual units. Ultimately, the Lowry proposal won the day, but only after a
compromise to provide housing elsewhere funded by a $5 million grant by HUD, $1.5
million from Denver and the State, and a $2 million contribution from the Lowry
Redevelopment Authority.77
Because the Air Force has not finished all of the procedural disposition requirements
relating to the entire property, Lowry does not yet have title to all parcels. Therefore,
they have used leases to transfer control to purchasers with the lease payment equal to
the agreed purchase price. In general terms, the lease carries an irrevocable option to
purchase. The purchase price is paid upon lease execution and a lease agreement for $1
per year executed. When the DoD releases title, Lowry then is able to transfer title to
the purchaser and the lease is voided. This is significant as it requires a level of
sophistication on the part of the purchaser.
4.2 Randy Stein & Skeena Holdings, LLC
Randy Stein has been involved in real estate since the early 1980's when he worked for a
developer in project acquisitions. Later in the 80's, he sourced deals and acted as a
project manager for eight builders in four southwestern states. In the aftermath of the
real estate collapse in 1989-90, he went into business for himself as a land broker in the
Denver metropolitan area. In this capacity, he not only developed an impressive
network of clients and associates in the Denver real estate market, but he also gained an
intimate knowledge of the Denver market as well as experience in negotiating and
wading through complex and time consuming real estate transactions.
Mr. Stein is also an avid athlete, having played professional tennis as well as being
involved in a recreational ice hockey league. His passion for hockey is also shared by his
five year old son, and Randy is looking forward to being active in his son's youth hockey
league. It is with respect to ice hockey that Stein's passion for sports and experience as
a real estate professional converged at Lowry.
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Precipitated by the impending closure of the ice rink he played at, coupled with the
growing popularity of hockey and a shortage of available rink space, Stein spotted an
untapped investment opportunity and formulated a development proposal by build a
skating facility. He subsequently optioned the aforementioned closing rink and lined up
prospective tenants. When that deal fell through, he began looking for an appropriate
space.
Attracted by the large airplane hanger space available, Stein first considered the
Stapleton Airport site which, like Lowry, was slated for redevelopment. At Stapleton,
however, they did not seem to be far enough along or have a clear enough vision of their
reuse plan to give Stein confidence in pursuing his project there. Conversely, Lowry had
a very specific reuse plan and as Stein remarked, "everyone was talking about what a
great plan they [Lowry] had and what a wonderful job Jim Meadows was doing."78
Furthermore, they had aircraft hangers.
On February 8, 1995, Stein contacted the Lowry Redevelopment Authority to express
his interest in the site and on March 1, presented his proposal for an ice arena. While
Steins proposal conflicted with Lowry's masterplan showing the hanger to be
demolished for open space, this would be the first deal that Lowry would secure and
the proposal complemented well the surrounding area's proposed recreational use.
Upon getting no response to his letter of intent, Stein wrote several more times before
receiving a June 27 letter where Meadows outlined the terms of the deal.
Problems
Stein had courted the Canlan Group as an investor to finance the project and Canlan
was presented to Lowry in the fall of 1995. Finally, on February 26, 1996, a contract
was executed. The contract was conditioned upon Stein getting financing from a
suitable institution and Canlan was agreed to as that investor. Meanwhile, Stein had
begun to lose faith in Canlan's ability to meet its commitment. The Colorado Avalanche,
a hockey team, also lost faith in Canlan during this time and withdrew its commitment
to practice at the arena. Of obvious concern to Stein, especially with the contact's May
3 1st drop dead date approaching, Stein contacted Meadows expressing this concern and
his desire to replace Canlan with a more dependable investor. As Stein recalls,
8 Stein, Randall, Interview with author, (June 30, 1994).
"I told them [Lowry] that Canlan's financial were bullshit. Jim
[Meadows] had his mind set on them, though, even though I told him they
weren't going to perform and that I could get someone else. I couldn't
believe it."79
On May 14 , Stein delivered information regarding other prospective investors to the
Lowry Redevelopment Authority but that information was returned unread on May 2 0 th.
At this same time, the American Hockey Company, a firm that successfully owns and
operates hockey arenas nationwide, had agreed to provide Stein financing. On May 2 1 ",
after officials at Lowry refused to meet with him, Stein and a representative of the
American Hockey Company went to Lowry, but again was refused a meeting. Getting
ever more panicked, the next day Stein again tried to present the American Hockey
Company's credentials, but was again refused.
On May 3 1 ", Stein, through a second mortgage on his house, put up the "earnest money
deposit" and was granted an extension. As Stein remembers,
"they [Lowry] finally agreed to an extension and began to smoke Canlan
out. Canlan was refusing to take Lowry's calls and they [Lowry] woke
up. After all that, Canlan was finally out and Lowry agreed to review
American Hockey's financials. They [Lowry] saw how good the
financials were and agreed to begin negotiations on a new contract with
American Hockey providing the financing."80
Contract Negotiations
The contract negotiation process was an arduous one for Stein. While he concedes that
"Lowry has a legitimate interest in making sure that proposals stay within their
[Lowry's] strict planning guidelines" and that "they can and should enforce strict
adherence to elevations, details, site construction, access, etc. and warranties of use,"
Lowry was unreasonable with regard to "constant subsequent amendments" and "ad
nauseaum attention to arguments over details such as the definition of floor area."
These conflicts over what Stein considers as "trivialities" resulted in Stein's threat to
withdraw. Ultimately, however, their differences were resolved.
Other Problems
Stein encountered other problems which he attributes to dealing with an authoritative
bureaucracy. One example stemmed from a verbal agreement he says he made with
' Ibid.
"' Ibid.
Lowry officials concerning rubbish disposal. Upon learning that he was not entitled to
the disposal site as he believed was agreed upon, he complained to Meadows.
Meadows wrote to him,
"To avoid future miscommunications, please be advised that your
organization may not rely on any representations by any party associated
with the LRA unless it is in writing and mutually executed by the
parties."'1
Environmental Scare
While Stein had had little or experience with public authorities, he did have experience
with real estate deals in which there were environmental questions. With regard to the
property at Lowry he was purchasing, Stein had, through the due diligence process and
consultation with his attorney, become versed in the federal environmental statutes
relating to his property and recognized the DoD's responsibility for all contamination
found previously as well as in the future. Furthermore, the hanger site "had been given a
clean bill of health" from the Air Force.
Under the requirements of CERCLA and the transfer, Stein was responsible for asbestos
removal associated with the hanger's renovation, which, by the middle of March 1997
was under way. At this time however, Stein's attorneys received a letter from the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment suggesting that;
"Although unlikely, the possibility exists that nuclear weapons had been
used as part of the specialist training conducted in Building 1499
[hanger], and that laboratories and a materials vault, were located in the
building. It is this possibility that has prompted the BCT (BRAC cleanup
team) to recommend that Building 1499 and several others undergo
screening for radiological materials prior to release for transfer deed to
the community."8 2
Stein recalls that he reacted with "dismay," saying that "I drove to the site and told
everyone to leave. All I could see was lawsuit." Stein then learned that although the
DoD had responsibility for a potential cleanup, this did not insulate him from lawsuits.
Also, if contamination was found, he faced the financial liabilities that would occur if
his job was shut down while he waited for the Air Force to get around to cleaning up the
site. To his surprise, Stein found out that the Air Force had been notified by Colorado
"' Meadows, James, Letter to Randall Stein, (February 25, 1997).
82 O'Grady, Barbara, State Project Manager, Colorado Department of Health and Environment, Letter to
Phillip Larson, (March 14, 1997).
of its concerns in early December, yet neither the Air Force or officials at Lowry had
notified him.
Ultimately, all would turn out well when no contamination was found except one drop
of mercury in a slop sink. For Stein, however, it had "given him the fear of God."
Other Problems
Stein has also felt frustrated by what he believes was Lowry officials unreasonable level
of control. As he puts it, "its our [Lowry's] way or the highway." Stein uses an incident
associated with the groundbreaking ceremony at his site as an example. Stein, feeling
justifiably proud on the dawn of his project, had successfully invited, among other civic
officials, both the mayors of Denver and Aurora to the ceremony. Stein was pleased at
this recognition of local support as well as a chance to generate publicity for his
company. Officials at Lowry, however, exercising their contractual right to control these
types of events, refused to allow the mayors attendences. They justified this decision
saying that they were not prepared to stage a "suitable" event. Furthermore, when Stein
gave the papers a press picture of himself wearing a hockey helmet (a play on the fact he
was both the builder and a future user of the facility), Lowry's public relations person
repeatedly tried to prevent the picture's use, saying, "she did not like it." Other issues
abound. For instance, Stein has been asking Lowry to provide signage so customers can
find the arena during the initial disorder caused by road construction, but to no avail.
He has been repeatedly asked to speak to one person after another, and upon finally
getting someone to concede signage is within their domain, has been told that they can
not provide the signs within fifteen days to be ready for the arena's grand opening.
The American Hockey Company also at times felt frustrated with Lowry's domineering
attitude. In one instance they were concerned by Lowry's failure to notify them of a
pending lawsuit related to the homeless issue.3 American Hockey's attorneys obviously
felt that this was not trivial as they referred to Lowry's failure to notify them as "at a
minimum, misrepresentation and quite frankly is [as] akin to fraud.""4 Notification of
any actions, suits, or proceedings affecting the seller or purchaser are required by the
Purchase and Sale Agreement.5
83 O'Reilly V. Perry, USDC District of Colorado, Case No. 95-CV-3188.
" Haligman and Lottner, P.C., Letter to Randy Funk, Esq., (February 6, 1997).
85 Section 4.1(b), Purchase and Sale Agreement between Skeena Holdings, LLC and Lowry Redevelopment
Authority.
The Good News
Stein believes that Lowry's masterplan is well designed and thought out. He believes
that the impact of the surrounding mixed use developments should provide a positive
backdrop for his project. He also feels that the large amount of recreational facilities
may generate an image that will help him market the ice arena. Stein is very concerned,
however, with the slow pace of these developments. Specifically, he feels that Lowry
could have easily facilitated the building of more housing at a faster pace. The
"presence of all of those rooftops," he says, would be valuable for making his project
more attractive.
4.3 Allied Jewish Apartments
Allied Jewish Apartments is a non-profit organization sponsored by the Jewish religious
community and both owns and operates three HUD elderly housing complexes with 400
units in Denver. Their mission is to "provide quality affordable housing and services to
seniors." In acquiring and constructing their facilities, they are both organized for, and
have the requisite experience to act as their own developer.
Two factors attracted Allied to Lowry. The first was location, the second, cost.
Barbara Caley, Executive Director, explained,
"There ware two reasons we looked at Lowry when RFP's came out. The
number one reason was location. Given the Denver market with not much
available land and the site's location almost in downtown, and the
proximity to such strong communities, especially on the Denver side. The
second reason was cost considerations. We are a non-profit and we were
buying an existing building at a low price."86
Although the necessary renovations were significant and carried a commensurably high
price tag, Allied believes that it is getting a $16 million dollar building for $9.5 million.
This is important for it will, "allow us [them] to do assisted living at affordable prices,
and that is our mission", Caley says. The extensive modifications are a consequence of
bringing the building up to code and to comply with ADA 7 requirements. Caley noted
that these were concerns as Allied contemplated the project but they were subordinated
" Caley, Barbara, Interview with author, (June 30, 1997).
8 Americans With Disabilities Act.
by their belief that the discounted price would "allow them to provide more housing
than they would have been able to do at another site," despite the cost of renovations.
Allied first became interested in the site in early 1995 in response to Lowry's first RFP.
They [Allied] had committed themselves to creating more housing and were looking for
an appropriate site. Therefore, when they received Lowry's RFP, they began discussing
the Lowry site seriously. Due to Allied's committee and board oriented organization,
these preliminary evaluations took significant time and they did not respond to this first
RFP. By the time that Lowry issued its second RFP, however, Allied was ready to
respond affirmatively. While they were originally interested in doing more housing and
were looking at another site, there was a person on Lowry's board who was also at the
State Housing Authority (CHAFA) who helped sell and facilitate the Lowry deal. As
Caley recalled,
"then began a long exchange of letters between the director of Lowry
(Meadows) and myself with the proposal finally going before the
disposition committee."88
The negotiation and disposition process took a little over a year. When asked if this
process had seemed particularly long, Caley suggested just the opposite, saying that
when put into the context of their experience, one year was fairly short. She elaborated,
"Our process is very time consuming. Everything must go though
committees and boards. We are very process oriented and understand
and appreciate bureaucratic procedure. 8 9
Issues
During the initial negotiations, two issues were of primary concern. They were questions
surrounding environmental safety as well as concern over both the amount and pace of
infrastructure being provided by Lowry.
Being a sophisticated owner and operator of real estate, Allied was well informed about
statutory environmental considerations. Furthermore, they were also dependent on
CHAFA, FHA, and HUD environmental sign-offs for their financing. Therefore, Allied
was particularly aware and sensitive regarding environmental hazards. Recognizing that
a proactive approach to environmental issues is necessary, even given the DoD's
"8 Caley, Barbara, Interview with author, (June 30, 1997).
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responsibilities, an environmental consultant and phase I study were commissioned. As
Caley remarked, "the Department of Defense is responsible--on paper."
At issue was an underground "plume" (water) lying under part of the site that had a
small level of chemical contamination as well as some potential soil contamination due
to previous cleaning activities. These were not determined to be hazards by the Air
Force, and Allied's consultant, upon study, also felt that they posed no risk to people's
health. In light of these determinations, CHAFA, FHA, and HUD ultimately signed off.
Allied remains concerned about infrastructure issues. As the military had no
requirement to meet local codes, many infrastructure improvements are required. Many
other proposed improvements, such as new roads, sidewalks, parks, and public
facilities, are of particular concern to the elderly. Because the Allied project is an
existing site sitting within the context of the surrounding area and without its own
roads, walks, spaces, etc., it is a "big" concern that these improvements are completed
by the time the housing becomes occupied. As Caley said,
"promises are cheap. Say we are in operation in eight to ten months,
which is our plan, and then they [Lowry] decides to put them
[infrastructure] in. It will inconvenience our residents who are elderly. "90
Caley does not doubt that Lowry will complete the improvements, but is concerned as
to when. She recognizes that it "may not be clear sailing." She also goes on to point out
that since Allied is a non-profit organization and on such a tight budget, they are unable
to help facilitate these improvements.
Control
Whereas Randy Stein found the highly controlled environment at Lowry difficult at
times, Caley has a different perspective. She feels that because Lowry's masterplan had
designated their site for elderly housing, they were able to acquire it even in the face of
competition from other potential users. She notes that Lowry's commitment to their
plan had enabled Allied, whose product is non-salable, to acquire a quality site while
preserving their mission.
Furthermore, Allied is used to heavy regulation. Caley pointed out that "the other
regulatory requirements" that they have to meet "are higher and more constraining than
9 Ibid.
Lowry's." Whereas Lowry's tight controls and restrictive masterplan did not pose a
hardship, it does provide for amenities very important to Allied such as the town center,
paths, and access to medical facilities. As Caley described it, "the plan is visionary."
Caley believes that because Lowry does not need to generate profits in the traditional
sense, they are able to provide a mix of uses as well as the above referenced amenities
where a private master developer might not. She feels that it is important to recognize
that these amenities are particularly valuable to their clients. Moreover, as suggested
above, Allied may not have even been able competitively to acquire a site at Lowry had
the masterplan not allowed for uses which were not "profit maximizing."
4.4 Village Homes
Village Homes was founded in 1984 as a residential builder and developer. Since that
time Village Homes has become one of Colorado's largest home builders, is consistently
ranked among Denver's top five builders, and has been recognized by Builder Magazine
as one of the top builders in the country. Village Homes generally develops its own lots
and is currently working on projects ranging in size from 19 to 834 lots. In the past, they
have bought finished lots, been sub-developers within master-planned communities, and
acted as master developer.
Gary Ryan, Vice President in charge of community development, says that Village
Homes initially became aware and interested in opportunities at Lowry trough the
extensive press coverage related to the closing and reuse plan. As the plan progressed,
Ryan says that "they kept their eyes on what was going on and let them know of our
potential interest."91 Later, Village Homes was contacted by Lowry about acquiring a
site because, as Ryan explained, "we [Village Homes] had experience with a
development on an infill site in West Denver and it was a traditional neighborhood
design with alley houses,92 and that was a component they were looking for."
For Village Homes, given that there are virtually no large infill locations available in
Denver, coupled with the booming Denver housing market, the site was very attractive.
Furthermore, the site affords employment access to Colorado Boulevard and centers
' Ryan, Gary, Interview with author, (July 1, 1997).
92 Traditional neighborhood design refers to a currently popular neighborhood design scheme which uses an
alley behind the streets to provide vehicular and service access, leaving the streetscapes uninterrupted.
along Route 225. In fact, the Denver CBD is not their primary employment market. Still,
despite mutual interest on both Village Homes' and Lowry's part, arriving at a deal was
very difficult. As Ryan remembered,
"You had to be determined to work with them [Lowry] and they had a
complicated process to go through to get a plan through. They had
master plans, zoning issues to go through and they had a tremendous
amount of citizen input through their citizen advisory group and so on.
So, they had a very substantial pre-development cycle to go through
before they could think of dealing with anyone and so, that was a long
part of the process.. .So, this was a long time horizon project towards
acquisition.
Ryan feels that in the end, Lowry was responsive to them because Lowry had a clear
vision of what they wanted and because Village Homes had proven that they could
successfully provide and deliver that product.
Village Homes could also have considered a site at the Platte Valley Redevelopment
Area which has large parcels available and is, in fact, even closer to downtown Denver.
Ryan explained that they found Lowry more desirable for a couple of reasons. While
pursuing a project at Lowry is "more complex than a typical deal," Ryan says that the
Platte Valley project "is even more complex and has political complexities that are going
to make ending up with a plan, infrastructure, and financing a much longer timetable."94
Ryan feels that this long timeline until a public decision, combined with unresolved
complexities, creates an unacceptable level of uncertainty.
Lowry's vision for the rest of the site was also important to Village Homes. They believe
that the mixed use concept, combined with all of the open space and recreational
amenities, will be attractive to prospective homebuyers. Ryan said that the very large
amount open space and amenities would have been difficult for a single private master
developer to financially justify and provide. Despite the concern that some
homebuilders and local homeowners had expressed, while the reuse plan was being
developed, concerning the homeless issue and the possible negative impact upon house
values, Ryan says that this was not an issue for Village Homes. He feels very strongly
about this point. Village Homes is "less paranoid" than many other developers, Ryan
says, and not only recognizes the needs of providing a housing for all economic groups
and the resulting public benefit, but also is "ready to accept the mixed-use that Lowry
* Ryan, Gary, Interview with author, (July 1, 1997).
has planned... [and]...trusts and appreciates the entity [Redevelopment authority]
managing the property" to consider and address these issues.
Negotiation
Unlike Allied's experience, Ryan believes that Village Homes paid "top market prices"
for their site. He feels that Lowry was able to get these prices because of the desirable
location and the construction boom. Village Homes' role can be probably best be
characterized as sub-developer working under the Lowry Redevelopment Authority as
master developer. When negotiating their agreement, a central issue was how this
relationship would be defined with regard to infrastructure provision. Ryan says that a
major part of the negotiation process was,
"how much improvements is the seller going to do for the price they
wanted? They were pretty clear on the amount of money they wanted.
We were able to compare that to our previous lot costs and negotiate
based on service price and knowing what development dollar should be
for that density and that form of developments."9
Given his experience, Ryan feels that the negotiations were "interesting" in that Lowry
solicited advice from Village Homes as to how to execute their vision. He says that
Lowry "had a clear picture of what their development plan was what role they needed
to perform as master developer and so created a framework for us to work from because
we had built this type of product."
In regard to the level of improvements that Lowry was willing to provide, "that's where
all the negotiation really took place...more negotiation about what was included than
about actual dollars paid," Ryan says. Ultimately, what they agreed on was, in Ryan's
words, "peculiar." In general, Lowry is developing all of the perimeter streets and the
spine utilities while Village Homes is responsible for some interior streets and auxiliary
utilities to be connected to Lowry installed mains. "Its a hybrid field. a little over half
of the lots we're buying are fully improved except for the alley, and 40% of the lots we'll
have to finish ourselves," Ryan says.
Another area that required negotiation was with respect to Lowry's strict design and
engineering guidelines. At issue was exactly what waivers, variances, or amendments to
Lowry's original planning guidelines would be required by Village Homes to give them an
' Ryan, Gary, Interview with author, (July 28, 1997).
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appropriate "comfort level." Lowry and Village Homes were able to reach agreement
because, as Ryan explained, "Lowry recognized that as a merchant builder we had
significant issues as to affordability and absorption while we recognized the constraints
that they [Lowry] had as a quasi public entity."
The entire agreement was contingent upon Lowry's acquiring title from the DoD. While
the lease in wait of title procedure works well for commercial tenants, the relative
unsophistication of the residential market requires that the properties be fee simple.
Ryan says that Village homes "started talking with Lowry about two years before [they]
executed an agreement--much longer than usual."
Another "significant challenge in the agreement process" was establishing incentives to
ensure an adequate time table. Ryan says that this was accomplished by 'triggering"
Village Homes' "performance by the delivery of certain accomplishments by
Lowry.. .then there was a drop dead date in the future where we could walk away and
have all funds refunded. This flexibility was critical in reaching an agreement."
Environmental Concerns
Village Homes was aware of the potential for environmental issues related to their site.
Ryan says that the first step was to "get familiar with what environmental
responsibilities lie where." Furthermore, in the sale agreement, Lowry was not willing to
make any unique warranties or representations about the property. Village Homes felt
comfortable with the environmental assessment that the Air Force had completed
commenting that they [Air Force] "had provided an organized and systematic report of
all the historic conditions, and then saw a review of all that information by a third party
consultant." In addition, Village Homes also did their own due diligence investigation.
Still, Ryan expressed some reservations as to the ever increasing discussion of developer
liability even where liability is explicitly assumed by another (i.e. DoD) party.
Another aspect of the environmental issue for Village Homes is whether potential buyers
will be concerned with this issue. Ryan says that they have addressed this with the
Redevelopment Authority and that Village Homes will have to "have a relatively high
level of disclosure... and going to have to be able to do some education." This is to
mitigate any possible fears that the public may have developed due to press stories
about contamination and confusion with the "Lowry Bombing Range."
Control
Ryan feels that the very high level of control the Redevelopment Authority exerts is a
double edged sword. On the one hand, he believes that Lowry is attractive because of
their "clear strategy." On the other hand, the specificity of the type of product Village
Homes must provide could be a liability if there are market changes. Ryan says that this
is mitigated by their "relatively small commitment to build only 83 homes." He also
thinks that the "other initial builders feel the same way--that they're looking at maybe a
two, or two and a half year programs at most." With a relatively short time horizon,
Village Homes believes that they can rely on their market research. Ryan indicated that
to contemplate larger projects with longer time horizons, they would need much greater
flexibility with respect to timing, product type, and design. He believes that the key to
being able to pursue projects with the complexities attendant to base development is
"sophistication and the access to information and the ability to judge the market."
4.5 Pulte Homes
Pulte Homes is the Nation's largest homebuilder with numerous recognitions for quality
of design and customer service including being named America's Best Builder for 1997.
Pulte operates in forty-one markets worldwide and sold over fourteen thousand homes
last year generating $2.3 billion dollars of revenue.
Like Village Homes, Pulte initially became interested in pursuing a site at Lowry because
of its location and the huge current and projected Denver housing market demand. Alan
Hyden, Director of Land Development for Pulte Homes' Colorado Division and who
holds a Masters in Planning from the University of California at Berkeley, said,
"We [Pulte] are looking for niches, and our research shows that there is a
market for "active adult" communities at infill locations in the Denver
market. Lowry's attraction is that it has large parcels, especially
considering it is an infill site, and it is locationally more desirable than
other available sites such as Stapleton. Also, their land plan is great."96
Unlike Village Homes, however, Pulte's attempts at acquiring a site at Lowry have been
met with frustration.
96 Hyden, Alan, Interview with author, (June 30,1997).
Pulte first approached Lowry officials in the Spring of 1996 to express interest in
pursuing a project at Lowry. As Hyden recalled, "given that they had 3,200 lots to get
developed, not an insignificant number, I assumed that our interest would be
welcomed." Yet, to Hyden's surprise, Pulte was simply told to come back in six
months. When Pulte reproached Lowry in the fall of 1996, they were once again put off
and told to return in the spring. Pulte's experience in the spring of 1997 proved no
different as they were yet another time told to come back in the fall. Through the
influence of a friend and real estate associate involved in a project at Lowry, Hyden has
recently been granted an audience by Lowry officials. With regard to this issue, it has
been rumored 7 that insider politics have played a role in the selection process,
specifically with regard to the influence of a Local marketing person who has "Lowry's
ear." It was implied that this person, who provides market research to developers, may
have a large amount of influence of who is chosen to pursue projects at Lowry.
However, it is impossible to confirm the veracity of these remarks.
Hyden is a thoughtful person, and he reflected on some of the issues surrounding
prospective involvement at Lowry. He feels that Lowry has an excellent development
plan and believes that there are significant benefits to be realized by working under the
Redevelopment Authority acting as master developer. For example, the location of the
education and medical research facilities through the public conveyance process as well
as Lowry's development of the recreational facilities, have already created externalities
that positively affect the rest of the site. Furthermore, the masterplan assembles a
combination of uses that otherwise may not have converged. From the developer's view,
working under a master developer relieves him of much of the infrastructure concerns,
and can also keep lots off of the books until they are developed. Hyden feels that
another important aspect for a company like Pulte who have "great research," is the
opportunity to be "pioneers."'
Conversely, Hyden also sees some pitfalls. One area of particular concern is market
timing and the flexibility to successfully go through market cycles. "There are examples
of fantastically planned master planned communities that went belly-up when they hit
the cycle wrong," he says. He feels that bases may be particularly susceptible to this
due to the quasi public nature of the Redevelopment Authority. This stems from the
possibility that they do not have "the normal economic pressures as a private sector
9 Persons who wish to remain anonymous and do not appear in this paper.
developer has," and that they may create a plan that is either not based on market
realities or not flexible enough to change when the market realities change.
Hyden thinks that this may be a danger at Lowry. As an example, he points to the
plan's strict adherence to the "new urbanism"" design guidelines. He is concerned that
focus group studies indicate that people generally don't like this design and that they
will be particularly vulnerable to a market downturn. Also, developing a site as large as
Lowry is a long process, and too strict an adherence to design guidelines may preclude
the flexibility to change to follow technology.
" New Urbanism is another reference to "traditional designs" as discussed in note # 93.
CHAPTER 5 WATERTOWN ARSENAL
5.0 Introduction
The Watertown Arsenal, 59 acres overlooking the Charles River in Watertown
Massachusetts, has been a military site since 1816 which, at its peak during World War
II, employed over 10,000 people. Although the 2,300 jobs remaining when it closed in
1967 seem small in comparison, the shock to the community at losing those jobs was not
insignificant.
Watertown faced similar issues as Boston would several years later at the Navy Yard.
Both cities would begin aggressively planning for their site's redevelopment, and both
sites were potentially valuable real estate99 . In Watertown's favor, the late 1960's
economy was strong and prospects for redevelopment of the Arsenal site looked
promising.
However, unlike Boston's experience, Watertown would prove to be remarkably
unsuccessful at attracting any development to their site for 14 years.
5.1 History
In April 1964, the DoD announced the closing of approximately half of the Watertown
Arsenal, consisting of 59 acres. By 1965, reuse planning had begun under the
assumption that purchase of the site could only be financed by a private developer if the
proposed redevelopment took place under a Federally approved urban renewal plan.
To coordinate these efforts, the Watertown Redevelopment Authority (WRA) was
created.
Watertown had expressed concerns regarding the "danger in allowing the GSA to
conduct a private sealed bid sale... [and]...the exploitation of the land and buildings for
commercial and speculative purposes by private developers."1' As a result, the WRA
looked toward acquiring the site. By doing so, they felt that they would be able to
99 This is not to imply that the Arsenal site did or does have the same intrinsic value as the Navy yard but
rather that it possessed excellent locational value and development potential.
". Watertown Arsenal Alternative Use Committee, The Evolution of a Plan, (Economic development
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exercise the "maximum amount of control" over the "type and character of new business
that would be created."101
In 1968, Watertown Town Meeting approved a plan for an office/industrial park and
appropriated $6,385,000 for the purchase of the site"' from the GSA, having been
assured by the WRA that the town would be reimbursed shortly when the site was
developed. This optimism was based upon the fact that Polaroid Corporation had
expressed an early interest in the site. With this in mind, the WRA had focused all of its
planning and attention on accommodating this possibility. Much to the WRA's dismay,
however, Polaroid ultimately did not purchase the site.
The next ten years were characterized by the WRA's failure to come up with a coherent
policy towards the site's reuse. As Mark Boyle, current director of the Watertown
Arsenal Development Corporation (the WRA's successor) and Chairman of the
Watertown Planning Board commented:
"They [WRA] hadn't even done a re-use plan. They had a very hard time
getting a re-use plan adopted, there were citizens in the community that
kind of set up an alternative re-use committee that didn't like what the
Redevelopment Authority was setting up. So they set up their own kind
of independent, rogue group. They would critique and tell the citizens
that there was a better way or a different way to do it. And they
actually went to town meetings -- we had a town meeting-form of
government at the time -- and stymied it and stopped the Redevelopment
Authority's plans at the town meeting on more than one occasion. So they
were a thorn in their [WRA] side for many, many years. And there was
just a lot of in-fighting, there was a lot of politics involved. It [WRA] was
an elected board at the time. So there was a lot of politics involved, and
politics can always delay things and cause problems."10 3
Finally, in the early 1980's, the WRA was able to develop a feasible plan. Boyle
explained:
"It was an urban renewal plan, and the urban renewal plan was the re-
use plan, and it basically set out what was allowed, and these
" Ibid.
"0 Given that nearly ten years later Boston would pay only $1,740.000 for the New Development area of
the Navy Yard which is a more desirable site, the question naturally arises as to why Watertown paid such a
seemingly extraordinary amount. Although the author posed this question to several people involved with
the redevelopment effort, no one could answer this question. In fact, Mark Boyle, the director of the WRA
and the Watertown Planning Board, indicated that the purchase price for Arsenal II (the second half of the
site about to be purchased by the WRA) will be less than $6,000,000.
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alternatives were allowed. They kind of wrote it and adopted it to be
somewhat flexible, to be able to respond to what the marketplace would
throw on the table for proposals. And so they adopted an urban renewal
plan that talked about development, financing, zoning and all that type
of stuff but was flexible enough to attract and accommodate the
negotiated bid process.""1 4
5.2 Steve Karp & New England Development
New England Development was founded in 1972 and since that time has become one of
the most successful real estate development companies in the country, having developed
more than 13 million square feet of retail space. Beginning with a project no one else
would consider, building a mall next to a competitor, Steve Karp saw an opportunity,
broke the rules, and successfully developed the Liberty Tree Mall. Since then, he has
continued to be an innovator in retail development.
Steve Karp had become interested in the Arsenal site around 1980. The site's location
made it ideal for a retail center and Karp recognized this. The potential trade area
encompassed seventeen zip codes in urban and suburban Boston, 600,000 people within
a five mile radius and 275,000 people within a three mile radius. In fact, research had
shown the potential for attracting shoppers from eighty-two zip codes. 5  As Karp
explained,
"I will show you one picture. [shows aerial picture of Arsenal site &
surrounding communities and headline saying 'this picture is worth a
thousand words and over 1/2 million people'] I put this together myself.
The headline tells the story. From the point of view of location, it is so
well located in the population base. Its so strong from a retail point of
view that it is a no brainer." 106
Yet despite its location, the Arsenal site had failed to attract developers for years.
Mark Boyle suggests that this failure to attract developers was in a large part due to
uncertainty related to what the town was willing to accept. Developers were wary of
spending time and resources planning a project when the community could come to no
consensus as to what they would allow. Furthermore, the WRA was very inflexible and
"exacting" in its posture towards negotiating with potential developers. Steve Karp
agrees.
104 Ibid.
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Change
The early 1980's marked a shift in the WRA's approach to management of the site.
Boyle proposed,
" I think there were a couple of changes. One of the changes was that all
the battles that could be fought were fought, and people thought it was
time to get the job done. Secondly, bodies changed on the redevelopment
Authority [WRA], and you had a more responsible group of
individuals.. .and they said, 'enough with the politics, this is an
embarrassment'... and they were willing to reach out to the development
community and be flexible.""07
This change was successful, as the WRA received several serious proposals for the first
time. Around this same time, Steve Karp, recognizing the site's retail potential, had
submitted a proposal to acquire and redevelop the site. The proposal called for
demolishing the existing buildings and building a complex three level mall with
underground parking similar to the, as yet unbuilt, Cambridgeside Galleria." Karp had
secured commitments from Jordan Marsh and Sears and these commitments could
virtually guarantee that the project would be built.
Karp's proposal was rejected, however, in favor of a proposal by a joint venture
between Ann & Hope and Gilbain Construction company. Karp had his doubts. As he
explained,
"The reason why they selected that group was they had Ben Thompson
for an architect. At the time, Ben Thompson was the hottest thing in the
country because he had just done Faneuil Hall . He told them he could
make this another Faneuil Hall. Not really understanding what makes
Faneuil Hall click, they [WRA] bought into it and were stuck. It was not
appropriate for this site."'"
Within a year, Karp's observation became apparent as the Gilbain project was unable to
secure financing. They [Gilbain] then approached Karp and suggested a joint venture.
Karp agreed, but on his own terms. He remembered answering, "yeah OK, but I don't
like your plan. I don't think it works". Karp did reluctantly agree to save some of the
Boyle, Mark, Interview with author, (June 24, 1997).
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existing buildings as originally planned because saving them "seemed to be a hot button
with the Redevelopment Authority."
Success
Karp now faced the job of getting the town to approve his plan. Watertown still
envisioned that their site could be "the next Faneuil Hall" and needed to be sold on
Karp's proposal. Karp remembered,
"It took a long time for them to understand that it wouldn't work and
that Faneuil Hall has some unique things. Most important what they
didn't really understand is that it [Faneuil Hall] has millions of square
feet of office buildings surrounding it and that people could walk out of
those office buildings and walk over there and they were doing it and
they were eating there and that created business. We didn't have
anything like that in Watertown. In fact, the area was more of an
industrial area and that it wouldn't even create that kind of interest."" 0
Where the WRA had been inflexible in the past, they now appeared open to new ideas.
As Karp noted,
"It was a long process of educating them to understanding that if it didn't
make economic sense, it wasn't going to happen. They had to give us
enough flexibility that we could create a plan that worked and had some
flow to it. That meant a lot of meetings, a lot of nights, a lot of
education. They actually hired a couple of consultants that turned out to
be very helpful...they were very instrumental and helpful in giving the
thing a little clarity and direction.""'
Another key element in the equation was the new plan's ability to secure financing. This
was the first time since 1968 that anyone actually had the confidence and financial
capability to redevelop the site and this fact was not lost on the WRA. Still, the process
was very time consuming before the property was finally sold for $4.3 million dollars.
Even then, some suggested that this figure was too low and that the WRA had "sold
out." 2
As Karp remembered, the process went on "for months, maybe years." He feels that
this was due to the WRA's lack of experience. As a developer of large regional malls,
however, Karp was accustomed to resistance and had the staying power to endure long
"" Ibid.
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delays. He noted, "you learn to be very patient in this business. You can't force
anything on a community until they are ready to accept it." Karp feels that this
experience and willingness to commit to a project even in the face of obstacles and
delays makes him far better positioned to take on this type of deal involving
bureaucratic pitfalls.
Other Considerations
With regard to environmental issues, the landscape in the early 1980's was significantly
different than it is today. While the Karp team did have an environmental study
performed, in retrospect, not nearly as much attention was paid to these issues as
would be today. When queried as to how he [Karp] would have dealt with the
environmental issue today, he indicated that it is a major concern on any site. He feels
that particular attention would need to be paid at a military site however, as they are
"notorious for having all sorts of contamination." When asked to comment on the
DoD's responsibility for cleaning up their sites, Karp responded,
"It's always nice to think that the federal government is standing behind
you because they certainly have deeper pockets than any developer. But I
think what we need to do is make sure that the responsibilities are in the
right place and that you deal with the exposure that you may have. You
need to be aware of what financial hardships that [you face] by
something happening during the construction and third party suits.
Doing your own investigation is one of the things that we spend a lot of
money up front on. Mostly with environmental experts to go in and
analyze sites to give us an idea of what the magnitude of the problem is--
not just rely on the information that is given to us by the federal
government or any third party so that hopefully you can make an
intelligent decision."113
When asked to comment on his experience at the Arsenal with regard to developing an
"untested" site, Karp indicated that this was not much of an issue. He explained that
many of his sites are "untested" and that he performs exhaustive market research on a
potential site's feasibility. He has confidence in the research's conclusions and therefore
has no hesitation being "the first one in."
He does, however, believe that it is important for him to be able to control a large enough
site so that the project is able to create its own space. Karp points out that he insisted
on purchasing the entire site even though he did not need the space. That way, he said,
he was able to make sure the uses on the remaining areas did not conflict with his vision
mI Karp, Stephen, Interview with author, (July 11, 1997).
of the site. Therefore, he is able to be much less concerned with the surrounding
environment besides access.
CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS
6.0 Introduction
Despite significant differences in the types of sites, circumstances surrounding their
transfer, economic climate, timing, and geography, common threads run through all of
the developer experiences relayed at Charlestown Navy Yard, Lowry Air Force Base,
and the Watertown Arsenal. This point is non-trivial, as it points to fundamental issues
facing private investment that seem to be attendant to the military base experience.
6.1 Questions Revisited
As suggested earlier in this paper, research was designed to explore issues unique to the
military base experience. To provide a framework for exploration, five central arguments
were identified that were suspected of playing a major role in private sector investment
decisions. These arguments were chosen in an attempt to focus the inquiry to issues
specific to the base experience, but general in applicability.
The evidence collected suggests a commonality of experience that relates to these
arguments. In practical application, however, these issues identified cannot be
considered in isolation, but rather are part of the complex mosaic that constitutes
investment decisions. Interestingly, there is also a commonality of issues between each of
the arguments. This section will once again look at the arguments identified in the first
chapter, but now in the context of the cases related in Chapters three through five.
6.1.1 Control & Flexibility
Military base redevelopment typically involves an LRA acting in the role of "master
developer". The term master developer, however, is not absolute. The ways in which
LRA's exercise their mandates vary greatly. This variation may occur between LRA,
across time, or both. Central to this issue is the amount of control the authority exerts
and the flexibility with which it applies that control. It was hypothesized that the
American urban renewal experience has lessons to offer base redevelopment efforts, and
evidence collected suggests that this is the case.
As discussed earlier, some early urban renewal experiences, such as those in Pittsburgh,
were successful because of cooperation and partnership between the public and private
sectors. This cooperation was born out of a pragmatism stemming from the real estate
community's (developer's) interest in securing federal funding for development projects
in blighted areas, and housing advocate's desire to address the housing needs of the
slums."4
As the renewal movement matured however, municipal planners became more ambitious
with their plans to revitalize downtowns. Bernard Frieden, in his book Downtown,
suggests that there arose a bias against the average person, and that "downtown plans
[were] aimed at improving public taste rather than satisfying it."115 Authorities charged
with urban redevelopment tended to overplan, as well as tried to create a market, rather
than use or exploit an existing one. This was a result of unilateral planning on the part
of the public authorities. As Frieden goes on to say, "the new downtown was
profoundly out of touch with popular taste and with developers who normally built for
the mass market. The key decisions on downtown projects were not made by
developers..." 116
In many ways, LRA's can resemble the renewal authorities discussed above. In essence,
they have the same mandate, namely to redevelop and bring economic vitality to under
utilized areas and are usually vested with the same planning powers. Moreover, they
are also subject to the community and political contention that the renewal authorities
typically faced.
Likewise, LRA's are also subject to some of the same pitfalls as described above. For
example, Watertown fell into such traps with its plans for the Arsenal site and Boston
almost did the same at the Navy Yard.
The Watertown Arsenal Experience
Watertown and the WRA's experience with the Arsenal is a good example of an
authority's planning without the input of the engines of development, namely private
developers. Indicative of this is Watertown's futile attempt to lure Polaroid to the site
and their subsequent fourteen years of unsuccessful marketing.
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Once Polaroid had expressed possible interest in the site, Watertown used this tepid
interest as the rationale for making plans for a high technology industrial park. As
Frieden points out with regard to downtowns, Watertown was trying to create a market,
not exploit one. Also, typical of this type of thinking was the hope for a more "elite"
use. This was confounded by the WRA's subsequent inability to present a coherent and
unified strategy for the site. Developers were therefore wary of becoming embroiled in
the community division that was so obviously plaguing the subject.
Ultimately, Watertown and the WRA were able to take a realistic and constructive
position towards the site's use. As Mark Boyle suggested, the WRA's "new found
flexibility ... and coherent strategy resulted in them getting five or six proposals--major,
big-time proposals." Boyle says that the BRA helped to "provide a model." Still,
Watertown was again ready to fall into the trap Frieden discusses. Resting with the
proposal they chose, were hopes of another Faneuil Hall. Yet, as Steve Karp says, the
WRA went ahead with this plan "not really understanding what makes Faneuil Hall
click." Finally, it took market realities and a sophisticated developer [Karp] to lead
them down the right path. The solution was not obvious however. It took Karp's vision
to defy convention and build a "downscale" mall. It is important to note, though, that
the WRA was now willing to be led, and therefore, successful at last.
The Charlestown Navy Yard Experience
Early reuse efforts at the Charlestown Navy Yard also fell prey to unrealistic planning.
Here, the EDIC did not try to impose an "elite" use on the site, but rather tried to
impose an unrealistic one. Despite the fact that shipbuilding or industrial uses were a
nice idea in response to job losses due to the Yard's closure, they were also impractical.
Northeast shipbuilding and industry were in serious decline and the economy (both local
and national) was in the doldrums. The early plans to exploit the yard for these uses
was therefore no more than wishful thinking.
Fortunately, when responsibility for the Yard's redevelopment fell to the BRA, it fell into
the hands of an agency that was singularly experienced and successful at reuse projects.
Success with their renewal efforts in the 1960's, and experiences wrestling with more
recent projects like Faneuil Hall, had given the BRA an important sense of balance
between their civic/public responsibility and the private sector's pragmatism and need
to generate profits. This manifested itself as what could be described as flexibility in the
face of reality. The BRA's handling of the redevelopment of Faneuil Hall illustrates this
point well.
Despite the fact that many respected real estate professionals remained naysayers, the
Rouse company undertook the Faneuil Hall project. Yet James Rouse was also painfully
aware of the high amount of risk. To help mitigate the risks as well as to prove key to
Rouse's taking on the project, was creative financing agreements such as tax breaks and
below market ground leases with the city sharing in the upside of future profits.
Furthermore, when cost overruns became apparent, the BRA agreed to reopen
negotiations even though there was an agreement in place. The BRA realized that the
success of the project, and by extension the city, rested with the viability and success of
the developer. The BRA was able to adopt the "entrepreneurial style" while employing
"adroit deal making" that Frieden says was so critical to the success of downtown
projects."'
This experience was obviously applied at the Navy Yard. The evidence collected clearly
shows that this type of "deal making" flexibility was a major determinant of private
sector investment, and ultimately, of success. The Yard is somewhat unique in that its
redevelopment authority, namely the BRA, was an existing entity with experience
managing complex redevelopment projects. Generally, military base redevelopment
authorities are created to solely manage a specific base reuse. This may result in a steep
learning curve for the LRA, although this is being mitigated by the increasing body of
experience with base redevelopment and help from consultants specializing in advising
LRA's.
The Lowry Experience
The Lowry Redevelopment Authority's reuse plan is both comprehensive and specific. It
is also apparently quite inflexible. Lowry officials make a point of the fact that they are
creating a masterplanned community. They also point out that they are committed to
that vision. Ann Rosen, Lowry's person in charge of commercial development,
expressed this recently when she said, "We want to make sure that we're developing a
community, not just selling real estate...So to the extent that we are flexible, no, we're
asking the developers to do their homework before they sign a contract with us."118
Furthermore, when queried as to what would happen if a developer approached Lowry
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with proposed changes once an agreement was underway, Rosen suggested that "it
would certainly put the existing contract in peril, but I'm not going to say we wouldn't
look at it."
Despite the above, currently, flexibility with regard to the development process is not
much of a concern for any of the developers working at Lowry who were interviewed.
They all, however, have different perspectives on this issue. For Randy Stein, flexibility
is somewhat irrelevant because his project has a specific single use with little room for
change, as well as a short and unphased development cycle. Moreover, he has specific
tenants either committed to the project or contemplating it, as well as a clearly defined
market upon which the project will stand or fall. Of great concern to him (and related to
this), however, is the amount of control the redevelopment authority is exerting over the
process. Stein is obviously frustrated by what he believes is Lowry's onerous oversight.
Allied Jewish Apartments also does not find flexibility to be an issue with regard to
working at Lowry. From Allied's perspective, however, this is a function of the type of
product they are providing and the type of organization they are. In regard to the latter,
Allied is, by virtue of being a HUD subsidized non profit provider of elderly housing,
highly regulated and therefore used to working within very inflexible guidelines.
Similarly, their product is so specific that any implied flexibility would be superfluous to
Allied. Of course, the site that Allied was offered had been designated as elderly
housing in Lowry's masterplan. Barbara Caley, while delighted with their site, questions
whether elderly housing was actually the most efficient use for their site given the
amount of modifications to the building that are needed. She also wonders whether a
site would have been made available to them all had their specific use not been in the
masterplan. In fact, Lowry had received a higher bid for Allied's site. Given these
factors, Allied has therefore benefited from Lowry's inflexibility.
Likewise, flexibility is not an issue for Village Homes. For them, this is a function of the
size of their commitment. In fact, concern over the Lowry Masterplan's inflexibility was
a limiting factor on the size of the project that Village Homes was willing to undertake.
Gary Ryan emphasizes that their "initial commitment is relatively small...only 83 lots,
and we don't think that's a significant time horizon." He goes on to say that if Village
Homes was contemplating a bigger investment, "flexibility would be much, much more of
an issue. We'd be looking at having some kind of framework for development, and then
we'd want to buy a superpad and do all our own development and set our own precise
standards within a more flexible framework."
While control of uses and types of uses is not an issue for Village Homes, it appears that
Lowry's concentration on specificity of product and control of all aspects of
development has resulted in Pulte Homes' as of yet unsuccessful attempts at acquiring a
site. A major factor for Village Homes being selected to work at Lowry was the fact
they had specific experience building a particular type of product. If Pulte's difficulty in
getting a site from Lowry is due to a focus on the specificity of product within a type,
the question arises whether this is appropriate for an entity that must ultimately
develop 3200 houses in a single market. Moreover, with regard to limiting themselves to
adherence to a rigid plan with such specific guidelines, Alan Hyden points out that the
Denver market will not always be as strong as it currently is, and is also "getting more
sophisticated, which will require greater flexibility to satisfy."
Certainly, control and flexibility become less important as the demand increases. Given
strong enough demand, an LRA could conceivably require almost anything. The
experience at Charlestown Navy Yard illustrates this as they clearly modified their
strategy in negotiating with developers as a function of demand for their sites. It is also
clear that developers have a commensurate decrease in concern with flexibility and
control in the face of increased certainty. Only time will tell if Lowry's current
inflexibility will have to be modified. The experiences at Charlestown and Watertown
suggest that if the Denver market cools off and Lowry faces more competition from sites
such as Stapleton, that their strategy will have to change. This point is articulated by
Mouchly et al, in their discussion of masterplanned communities, recognizing the very
long time horizon of "20 or more years before the first product recycling ... [that]... will go
through several economic cycles" and the need for "superior planning and design, along
with permitting for maximum flexibility" to "assure survival."119
Externalities and Public Amenities
Another dimension of the LRA acting in the capacity of the master planner or developer
is the LRA's ability to create positive externalities which may benefit the private
investor. As Wheaton and DiPasquale point out in their book, Urban Economics and Real
Estate Markets,
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"there is substantial empirical evidence that the value of each particular
site depends not just on its own intrinsic characteristics, but is also
strongly influenced by the uses that occur on other nearby sites, the
overall design of the neighborhood, and by the way streets, infrastructure,
and open space that are provided throughout the community."120
They also point out that property owners will generally act independently, or in their
own best interest, thereby disregarding the collective interest. Therefore, there is a
problem created where individual property owners will attempt to internalize their own
externalities while hoping to "free ride" on others for public amenities. While a common
attempt at a solution is governmental intervention such as taxes, or more progressive
subsidies, a closely controlled masterplan may offer the best solution. As introduced in
Chapter 1, a master developer will presumably attempt to maximize value on an
aggregate level. Again, as Mouchly et al point out, "the developer's basic task with
these projects is to create value to all the participants in the process"."
The evidence collected for this paper suggests that this argument may be taken a step
further for the unique case of military bases where the LRA is acting as the master
developer. This is because the LRA may, by virtue of its being a quasi-public entity that
is not necessarily profit driven, actually forgo maximizing gross aggregate value of the
entire site for maximizing aggregate value for the individual developers of the sub-
parcels. An example of this is the vast amount (800 acres) of open space that Lowry
has provided for. While open space and public amenities are a common way that value
is maximized on an aggregate level to the owner of the entire site, it stands to reason
that by providing more space than required to reach this maximum, a master developer
could transfer the value lost through this inefficiency. Certainly the developers
interviewed support this notion implicitly. At both the Navy Yard and Lowry,
developers suggested that while there are some negatives to working under the control of
an LRA, at both sites there is a level of amenities that they doubt would be provided by
the private sector.
Of course, there is another side to this coin. The LRA could, conceivably, create negative
externalities that could have a detrimental effect on value. Gary Ryan recognized this
point saying, "if Lowry decided to allow a tattoo parlor down the street from our
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development, it would certainly hurt us." Yet, he went on to say that Lowry was not
only bound by the masterplan, which they had reviewed and felt comfortable about the
potential uses at other sites, but that there was an "element of trust" in their
relationship with Lowry. Likewise, this was not an issue for Allied. Barbara Caley said
that not only did she trust Lowry, but that the neighboring communities also bear enough
pressure to keep what Allied would consider an "objectionable use" away. Yet certainly
the possibility for negative externalities exist. Suggestive of this is both Lowry's and
potential developers early struggle with the issue of housing for the homeless.
6.1.2 Timing & Certainty
Closely related to the discussion above and of obvious concern to developers, is that
they feel confident that they will be able to pursue their project with reasonable
certainty, and that once underway, they will be able to finish it on a timely basis. This
issue is tremendously important to private developers for two reasons. First, real estate
projects, and especially those of the scope typical at bases, are very capital intensive.
Not only does it take large amounts of capital to actually build the projects, but the
planning is also tremendously expensive. This, then, has two implications; 1)
developers want to be reasonably assured that they will be able to pursue a project
before committing vast sums to planning, and 2) because of the typically high returns
that real estate development must generate (both on equity and debt), any delays in a
project once committed to and underway are very expensive. The second reason that
timing is crucial to developers is their dependence on the capricious nature of the
markets on whom they rely. Any unanticipated delays could mean that a developer
may miss a window of opportunity upon which success was contingent.
Evidence suggests that this issue varies significantly between developer. Certainly,
smaller developers such as Randy Stein have fewer resources and less patience to wade
through the procedural complexities attendant to base reuse. In fact, Stein suggests that
if he had to do it over again, he would probably not choose Lowry. From Barbara
Caley's perspective, however, the process was reasonably fast. Allied is an
organization that is organizationally compatible to working within complex
bureaucracies. Likewise, Steve Karp is no stranger to the maze of bureaucratic process
that typifies the retail mall development business. Yet even developers who specialize
in "complex urban development," such as Robert Kenney, are not always immune to
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these issues. With regard to Building 105 at the Charlestown Navy Yard, delays
resulting from environmental issues may ultimately shelve the project if he feels that
these delays will cause him to miss the current residential investment opportunity.
Another nuance of certainty is related to how title is held and/or transferred to the
developer. At Lowry, for instance, much of the site is still under lease with the Air Force
pending final disposition. The redevelopment Authority has overcome this obstacle by
negotiating leases with a payment equal to the agreed upon purchase price. The
property is therefore leased until title can be transferred. For a sophisticated
commercial developer, this structure presents little problem, simply requiring slightly
more diligence on the part of the attorneys. For a residential developer, however, this
structure is unacceptable no matter how sophisticated the developer is. This is because
residential homeowners demand a fee simple transaction, lacking both the where-with-
all and inclination to participate in the complexities of ground leases. The same issues
arose at the Navy Yard, where the buildings in the Historic Monument Area are all
subject to ground leases. Therefore, any residential development contemplated there (as
Bob Kenney may build) will almost certainly have to be rental.
6.1.3 Signaling & Externalities
As suggested in Chapter 1, little has been written on the herd mentality of developers.
Caplin et al explore this question in relation to retail tenants on Sixth Avenue in New
York."' In their paper they suggest that the opening of the Bed, Bath & Beyond on lower
Sixth Avenue, an area that had been shunned by upscale retailers, generated information
externalities that signaled to other retailers of the viability of locating there, and that this
signaling went beyond retailers who shared the same customer base. James Rauch also
touches upon this issue in his article, Does History Matter Only When it Matters Little? The
Case of City-Industry Location.m' In it, Rauch concludes that there has been a "first mover
disadvantage" to firms locating at "new sites." He also says that developers have been
able to partly overcome this through discriminatory pricing.
These issues have direct relevance upon base reuse experience. Despite the fact that
little anecdotal or quantitative research has been done on the subject, the above
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discussion is not ground breaking in the sense that conventional wisdom has long
applied these ideas.
Bases are typically untested sites. As such, evidence suggests that there is a reluctance
to be the first developer in "to test the water." Despite Lowry's confidence and great
early success, Ann Rosen is introspective on this point acknowledging that "there's
skepticism in the market place...It takes those individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit
to see, understand, and exploit the opportunity at this point in time.""" With regard to
"first mover disadvantage," although Randy Stein has probably not read Rauch's article,
he believes that he was at a distinct disadvantage by being Lowry's first commercial
sale. He also believes, however, that he paid a well below market price for his building
and site. While this points to evidence of what Rauch refers to as "price discrimination"
aimed at mitigating the "first mover disadvantage," in retrospect, Stein says that "I'm
not sure that the great deal was such a great deal. I feel as though I was the Guinea pig--
and still am." 125
The developers interviewed who have worked at the Navy Yard all recognized these
points. For Bob Kenney, although he was pioneering office development, the fact that
the residential projects were being met with success was highly important. Similarly,
Raymond Company had paid close attention to Kenney's experiences. INE was the first
developer to work at the Yard, and they recognized the implications of being so in the
context of the above discussion. Paul Davis says that they knew they were the
"information gatherers." This resulted in certain hardships for INE such as having to
educate the public through unconventional marketing and offering initial discounted
rents. Furthermore, the implicit market risks were obvious. As Rauch suggests, these
disadvantages were able to be mitigated by discriminatory pricing by the BRA.
6.1.4 Infrastructure
It comes as little surprise that concerns over infrastructure, namely what will be
provided and when, are of major concern to developers contemplating working on bases.
Indeed, this is also readily apparent to LRA's as well. As Ann Rosen pointed out,
"they're counting on us to bring infrastructure to the site by X date, they're counting on
us to build roads and utilities....that's what the deal making process is all about." As
noted in Chapter 1, this stems from the fact that the military did not have to abide by
124 Rosen, Ann, Interview with author. (June 27, 1997).
12 Stein, Randall, Interview with author, (July 28, 1997).
local codes and the reuse plans typically call for significant changes to street design.
Because of the enormous size of these bases, sites are typically contained wholly within
the larger base. Therefore, developers are dependent upon the LRA to provide access
and utilities to their sites. Failure or delays to do so can trigger consequences as
discussed above in Section 6.2.2. Also, different uses are affected differently by this
issue. For example, Randy Stein says that he is not terribly concerned with the pace of
road and sidewalk construction as his future clients are already able to access his site.
These people will be coming to his site to use the skating arena and are therefore
probably indifferent to minor inconvenience due to ongoing construction. Conversely,
this issue is very important to Allied. Their clients are retired seniors who will be using
the roads and sidewalks daily, walk frequently, and accordingly are greatly affected by
any delays in completing these projects.
6.1.5 Environmental Remediation
Liabilities associated with environmental contamination proved to be a major concern of
the developers interviewed, either when contemplating their projects or in hindsight.
This is hardly surprising, given the legal minefield facing the owners of toxically
contaminated sites, combined with the infamous prevalence of contamination at military
installations. Key to the understanding of this issue appears to be developers fear of
incurring either direct or indirect liabilities associated with contamination that may be
found subsequent to commencement of the project. This is despite the fact that the DoD
is liable for all cleanup, even for as yet unknown contamination. The developers spoken
to also allude to the need for sophistication concerning this issue prior to purchase. As
Steve Karp, a very sophisticated real estate investor said, a developer "cannot just rely
on the information that is given to us by the federal government or any third party."
This means having the willingness and the resources to hire consultants and do an
internal environmental due diligence report.
While the DoD, under section 120(h) of CERCLA, is responsible for all remedial action
required to clean up hazards that its activities have caused in the past, as well as
requires the DoD to warrant that it will perform any necessary actions in the future, this
does not provide a panacea to the developer of sites where this legislation is applicable.
Since Section 120(h) requires the government to only give covenants that remedial action
has been completed to parties who would not qualify as potentially responsible parties,
it is unclear whether a developer purchasing a site would be held liable. To not be held
liable, it is conceivable that he would have to qualify as an Innocent
Landowner/Purchaser. However, as Larry Schnapf points out in his paper, Sales of
Military Bases and Surplus Supplies Pose Environmental Threats, "it is difficult to see how
any purchaser of a military installation could qualify as an Innocent landowner since the
requisite due diligence would almost certainly give the purchaser reason to know that
hazardous substances may have been disposed at the property." 126 Indeed, while the
Air Force Base Conversion Handbook specifically says that the EBS satisfies its due
diligence requirements for real estate transactions, it also warns that purchasers should
not rely on the EBS to satisfy their due diligence to qualify as an Innocent Purchaser.
Other confusing issues remain as well. For instance, the DoD is responsible for
performing a phase I investigation to determine whether hazardous substances or
petroleum products have been stored for more than a year. But what about sites where
materials were stored for less than one year? Also, it is unclear whether leases fall
within Section 120(h). Given the fact that ground leases appear to be a valuable
instrument to base redevelopment, this is important. Finally, Bruce Amos raises
important questions related to property transfers. He suggests that while Section 120
applies to a parcel's designated reuse at the time of transfer, it may not cover
subsequent changes of use in the future.12 ' Amos' article discusses the options that
private sector investors have in applying environmental insurance products. With
regard to this type of insurance, many developers seem to be fairly unfamiliar. Others,
such as Paul Davis, suggested that this type of insurance is prohibitively expensive.
The developers interviewed also specifically expressed concerns over potential delays
related to hazard detection. This issue relates closely again to the discussion in Section
6.2.2 regarding timing and certainty. Several developers captured this sentiment,
referring to the uncertainty of when the DoD would commence a cleanup and how long it
would take. For a developer like Randy Stein, whose project is already underway, these
questions could prove devastating.
One thing is clear, despite statutes that are in the developer's favor, developers must be
diligent on their own account and be aware that military bases pose unique traps whose
risks must be understood.
121 Schnapf, Larry, "Sales of Military Bases and Surplus Supplies Pose Environmental Traps," The Real
Estate Finance Journal, (Winter 1994), pg. 25.
2 Amos, Bruce, "The Application of Environmental Insurance in Redevelopment Associated With Military
Base Closures," The Real Estate Finance Journal, (Fall 1996)
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS
The evidence collected in this study strongly suggests that there are issues facing private
investors that are attendant to the military base reuse experience. While these issues
may not be completely unique to military bases per se, they are unique in the sense that
they are endemic rather than incidental.
Primarily, these issues are those identified in Chapter 1 and discussed in Chapter 6.
However, as the evidence and discussion suggest, the issues themselves are multi-
faceted and cannot be looked at in isolation. They are all both interrelated and
interdependent.
Successful base reuse will always be dependent on a healthy economy and adequate
demand. Therefore, base experience will vary as a function of the real estate markets,
regardless of its being a base. However, I believe that military bases are also subject to a
demand curve of their own making. Here, I suggest that demand is derived as a function
of the private sector's implicit application of a matrix composed of considerations for
the issues uncovered in this paper. This is important because it suggests that by paying
attention to these issues, in addition to the typical market considerations that typify
other sites, military bases are able to have a significant impact upon their success. In
fact, it appears that these issues may sometimes even outweigh other market
considerations. In this case, a base's success or failure may not necessarily reflect its
local economy. For example, Hamilton Air Force Base, which lies in Marin County--one
of the nations wealthiest, has been surprisingly unsuccessful in its redevelopment efforts.
Conversely, England Air Force Base, outside of Alexandria, Louisiana, has been quite
successful in its efforts despite a lackluster local economy.
Therefore, while bases will always be subject to market or systematic uncertainty, by
keeping these issues in mind, bases may be able to neutralize unsystematic or
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Generally, broad concepts to stay aware of are;
" Flexibility Flexibility appears to be the one general formula for success. For bases
such as Lowry who have been relatively inflexible in the past, it will be interesting to
see what impact market challenges will have, and how the redevelopment authority
reacts.
" Control Control appears to be a double edged sword. It is certainly important that
the LRA, once it has a viable reuse plan, implement it with authority. However, the
LRA must also be willing and able to temper the amount of control it exerts (related
to flexibility above).
Pragmatism Perhaps above all, the LRA should be pragmatic. The success of the
reuse plan ultimately stands or falls upon private sector investment. The private
sector is profit driven, period. Therefore, while issues discussed in the introduction
certainly preclude turning these sites over to private developers to run amok, the
LRA must act in the best interest of the community and the developers.
Consideration of these issues also suggests that certain types of developers may be
better equipped to work at bases than others. While there is a broad range of types of
developers who have successfully worked at bases, there appears to be a surprising
commonality between them with regard to their skills, capabilities and tolerances.
Furthermore, the steep learning curve and significant "education" that these developers
gain, suggests that perhaps there is an opportunity to specialize in these types of
transactions. The experience at the Navy Yard implies this, as some of the original
developers of the Yard are still building or contemplating future projects there.
Moreover, the extremely long redevelopment period of a base (the Yard, one of the most
successful, is only two third completed after 20 years) means that this may be a viable
niche for an investor to pursue.
There are several factors or capabilities that appear to effect developers ability to
successfully meet the attendant challenges at military bases;
* Sophistication. All of the successful developers interviewed possessed a level of
sophistication that allowed them to wade through the procedural complexities that
must be understood to pursue a project at a base conversion. For example, Lowry's
unusual use of ground leases while waiting for title transference requires that the
developer be comfortable with atypical and creative legal agreements. Moreover, the
sheer volume of procedural issues requires that the developer not only be able to
understand and execute the requisite process, but also must be willing to do so.
Therefore, a developer such as Allied Apartments is especially well suited for this
challenge as they are very procedurally and bureaucratically oriented themselves.
Others, such as New England Development are also well equipped. NED is very
comfortable with difficult and complex negotiations and real estate transactions as a
result of their experience building suburban malls, with all of the attendant municipal
planning and community resistance. Likewise, familiarity with the "system" is also
an advantage. As mentioned above, many of the original developers at the Navy
Yard are still investing in projects there twenty years later. Also, as evidenced by
Bob Kenney and Jim English, who both worked for the BRA before becoming
developers at the Yard, familiarity and comfort working with the redevelopment
authority is important.
Similarly, many of the projects require unconventional approaches with regard to
product type and financing. Developers such as Village Homes, who were able to
demonstrate they had the capability and willingness to provide an unusual product
type are at a distinct advantage when these products are favored. With regard to
financing, the feasibility of a project may rest upon the developer's sophistication
and ability to devise and negotiate creative financing packages. Certainly this was
the case with INE at the Yard.
* Resources The developers who have had satisfying experiences all have notable
resources which enable them to develop market research and environmental studies,
and to overcome the significant legal challenges. One of Randy Stein's biggest
objections to his experience to date are the relatively large legal expenses he has
incurred relative to what he believes he would have spent at a conventional site.
This points to the fact that perhaps larger organizations with large legal budgets may
find this facet of base redevelopment less objectionable. Also, larger projects may
have an advantage over smaller ones by being able to diffuse the large legal and
administrative expenses over a larger budget, thereby generating economies of scale.
Developers also need access to, and the ability to afford, good market research and
forecasting. This is critical because of the long time it can take between the time
negotiations begin and the time the product hits the market. Firms such as Pulte
Homes are able to use this to their advantage, Alan Hyden suggests, because they
have "great research." Other firms such as NED, whose product development cycle
is particularly long, are also at an advantage.
* Patience As suggested, the base redevelopment process is not only complex, but
also very lengthy. Related to the discussion above, developers and their investors
must have the willingness, confidence, and product type to allow them to work
within a very slow process and possibly realize their profits in the future. This
favors some organizations over others. Certainly, organizations such as non-profits
are uniquely appropriate in this regard. Others, such as home builders, probably
need to have a project that is large enough to have a development cycle sufficiently
long as to be able to value profits that are not quickly realized. Likewise, projects
that require ongoing operation and management and that generate recurring revenues
such as Randy Stein's ice arena, retail malls, and rental apartments, also may be
particularly well suited for base redevelopment.
In general, the closing of many of these bases have offered developers the opportunity to
sites which have been, until now, unavailable to the public. Because of the large size of
these sites, combined at many sites, with good locations and amenities, the investment
opportunities may be substantial. There are, however, significant issues associated with
these sites by virtue of their ex-military status. In light of these issues, developers must
possess the qualities discussed above to successfully meet the challenges posed by them.
For the developer who does, the rewards can be great.
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